On 5/17/24 10:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/17/2024 8:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/17/24 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/17/2024 8:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
>
You already admitted that True(L,p) and False(L,p) both return false.
This is the correct value that these predicates correctly derived.
>
Right, but that also means that we can show that True(L, true) returns false, which says your logic system is broken by being inconsistant.
>
>
Not at all. Your version of the Truth Teller paradox has
the conventional lack of a truth object as the Liar Paradox
and the Truth Teller paradox: What are they true about?
>
In other words, you logic doesn't have an absolute idea of truth!!!
>
It does have an immutably correct notion of {true on the basis
of meaning} and rejects finite strings as not truth bearers on
this basis.
Nope, because you said the value of "true" doesn't exist, truth is dependent on having something to make true.
The object that made the statement true, was that True(L, p) said that p wasn't true.
>
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
Yes, which makes True(L, a sentence proven to be true) to be false.
Thus, it is inconsistant.
Or we can use the arguement that since
p is ~True(L, p) which is false that p is alse ~True(L, ~True(L, p) which, since True(L, p) is "established" to be false, and thus ~True(L,p) to be true, we can say that True(L, ~True(L, p) must be true and thus p, being not that is false.
So, we can prove that p is both false and true, and thus your system is BY DEFINITION inconsistant.
>
This sentence is true.
What is it true about?
It is true about being true.
What is it is true about being true about?
>
This turns out to be Kripke ungrounded yet Kripke did
not know the algorithmic basis for Kripke grounding.
>
*Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke* (1975)
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
>
>
>
It seems that now you are now disagreeing with your own self. You are
saying the predicates are broken BECAUSE THEY RETURN THE CORRECT VALUE.
>
>
No, your logic system disagrees with itself, I am just pointing that out.
>
>
All that you pointed out is that you still don't understand
the Truth Teller paradox.
>
No, YOU don't understand that True MUST be a truth beared, or you are just a liar that your system has a Truth Predicate.
>
>
Remember, we started with
>
p in L is ~True(L, p)
you say True(L, p) is false
*No you said this* (Socratic question)
No, YOU said it first, and I agreed.
What else are you going to make it?
(Socratic reply question)
thus the truth value of p MUST be true, since it is not the falseness of True(L, p)
>
We test p for True or False if neither it is tossed out on its ass.
It is like we are testing if a person is hungry:
We ask is the person dead? The answer is yes and then you
say what if they are still hungry?
RED HERRINBG.
Since you have claimed that True(L, p) is false, by the stipulated definition of p, it MUST be a true statement, and thus you have stiplated that True(L, <a statement proven to be true>) turns out to be false (since that statement IS p), and thus you system is
Thus we can say that p is also the equivalent in L of
>
We sure as Hell cannot correctly say that.
Why not?
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
In other words, you system doesn't allow the assignement of a statement to have a refenece to itself, which is one of the criteria in Tarski.
~True(L, ~True(L, p))
~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is not true")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is true")) is true
Nope, "This statment is true" is different then the statement:
P, in L, is defined as ~True(L, P)
It it just
P in L is defined as "P is not true."
The difference is the statement P is not true has the possibility of being a non-truth bearer, but the predicate True(L, p) doesn't have that option.
>
Which since we showed that True(L, p) was false, that means that the outer True predicate sees a true statement (since it is the negation of a false statement)
~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
Yep.
and thus True(L, ~True(L, p)) is true, and thus we can show that p must be false.
>
By this same reasoning we can show that "a fish" must be false.
Nope, because a fish wasn't defined to be any of those sentencds.
Thus we have a contradiction.
>
So, if you want to claim "Truth Teller Paradox", the only answer is to say that True(L, p) isn't actually a truth-bearer,
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
Right, and that it the problem. (we don't need the True(L, ~x) part though.
p is defined as ~True(L, p) which you say is false.
thus, we can also say, by the definiton of p that
p is defined as ~True(L, ~True(L, p))
The first statement makes p be true, as you said True(L, p) is false.
The second, since p is a true statement, make p false since True(L,~True(L,p)) would be true, since we just showed that ~True(L,p) was true since True(L,p) was false.
So, we have an inconsistant logic system, which you don't seem to understnad.
That, you you need to cut out of your logic system one of the primative operations of logic.
and thus it isn't a predicate, and you have lied that your system has one.
>
>
This is the problem with the assumption that a Truth Predicate exists, and is what Tarksi was pointing out, but which seems to be above your level of understanding.
>
…