Re: Diagnostics

On 10/18/2024 6:50 PM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:

Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote:

On 10/18/2024 2:42 PM, George Neuner wrote:
>

  To ensure 100%
functionality at all times effectively requires use of redundant
hardware - which generally is too expensive for a non safety critical
device.

>
Apparently, there is noise about incorporating such hardware into
*automotive* designs (!).  I would have thought the time between
POSTs would have rendered that largely ineffective.  OTOH, if
you imagine a failure can occur ANY time, then "just after
putting the car in gear" is as good (bad!) a time as any!

 TI for several years has nice processors with two cores, which
are almost in sync, but one is something like one cycle behind
the other.  And there is circuitry to compare that both cores
produce the same result.  This does not cover failures of the
whole chip, but dramaticaly lowers chance of undetected erros due
to some transient condition.

The 4th bit in memory location XYZ has failed "stuck at zero".
How are you going to detect that?
One of the FETs that controls the shifting of the automatic
transmission as failed open.  How do you detect that /and recover
from it/?
The camera/LIDAR that the self-drive feature uses is providing
incorrect data...  etc.
There are innumerable failures that can occur to compromise
the "system" and no *easy*/inexpensive/reliable way to detect
and recover from *all* of them.

For critical functions a car could have 3 processors with
voting circuitry.  With separate chips this would be more expensive
than single processor, but increase of cost probably would be
negligible compared to cost of the whole car.  And when integrated
on a single chip cost difference would be tiny.
 IIUC car controller may "reboot" during a ride.  Intead of
rebooting it could handle work to a backup controller.

How do you know the circuitry (and other mechanisms) that
implement this hand-over are operational?
It is VERY difficult to design reliable systems.  I am not
attempting that.  Rather, I am trying to address the fact that
the reassurances POST (and, at the user's perogative, BIST)
are not guaranteed when a device runs "for long periods of time".