Re: encapsulating directory operations

Bonita Montero <Bonita.Montero@gmail.com> writes:

Am 02.06.2025 um 17:24 schrieb Scott Lurndal:

Bonita Montero <Bonita.Montero@gmail.com> writes:

Am 01.06.2025 um 09:43 schrieb Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
>

On Sun, 1 Jun 2025 07:58:54 +0200, Bonita Montero wrote:

>

Sth. like this:
>
for( directory_entry const &de : recursive_directory_iterator( "\",
directory_options::follow_directory_symlink ) )
cout << de.path() << endl;

>

You need the dirfd functions to avoid certain potential security holes
on operations with symlinks.

>
Which security holes ?
>

>
     The fchownat() function shall be equivalent to the chown() and lchown()
     functions except in the case where path specifies a relative path. In
     this case the file to be changed is determined relative to the directory
     associated with the file descriptor fd instead of the current working
     directory. If the access mode of the open file description associated
     with the file descriptor is not O_SEARCH, the function shall check
     whether directory searches are permitted using the current permissions
     of the directory underlying the file descriptor. If the access mode is
     O_SEARCH, the function shall not perform the check.

>
And why is this relevant for directory_iterator or
recursive_directory_iterator ?

 Why are you asking this question on comp.lang.c?