Sujet : Re: Torvalds Slams Theoretical Security
De : candycanearter07 (at) *nospam* candycanearter07.nomail.afraid (candycanearter07)
Groupes : comp.os.linux.advocacy comp.os.linux.miscDate : 25. Oct 2024, 19:10:06
Autres entêtes
Organisation : the-candyden-of-code
Message-ID : <slrnvhnn9i.2ou1.candycanearter07@candydeb.host.invalid>
References : 1 2 3 4 5 6
User-Agent : slrn/1.0.3 (Linux)
Lawrence D'Oliveiro <
ldo@nz.invalid> wrote at 22:19 this Thursday (GMT):
On Thu, 24 Oct 2024 18:48:57 +0100, Richard Kettlewell wrote:
>
Lawrence D'Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> writes:
>
Weak cryptography is easy to fix. The hard part to fix is weak random
numbers.
Other way round. A bad RNG can be swapped out for a better one with
little or no impact on anything else.
>
Unfortunately, you can never be sure your RNG is good.
You could always do what random.org does and read background radiation.
Probably.
-- user <candycane> is generated from /dev/urandom