Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases with mt new notion of {linguistic truth}

On 9/9/24 3:07 PM, olcott wrote:

On 9/8/2024 12:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/8/24 9:24 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
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*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
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knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

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The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
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Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.

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The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
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Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.

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Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
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The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.

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I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
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This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
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I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
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Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.

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Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term.
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I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM

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Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
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A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
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*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
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If that is your claim, then a statement is Linguistically FALSE if there is NOT such a connection (verses there is a connection to its negation), since THAT is the definiton of the Truth Predicate of Tarski, it results in TRUE if the statement is True, or FALSE if the statement is either FALSE or not actually a truth bearer, and it is that later part that causes the problem.
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 LP = "this sentence is not true"
according to MY truth predicate
~True(LP) & ~True(~LP) MEANING NOT ALLOWED IN ANY FORMAL
SYSTEM BECAUSE IT IS NOT A FREAKING BEATER OF TRUTH.

So, you admit that you system can't have a truth predicate per the required definition either.
Remember, True(L, x) if x is not a truth bearer must return FALSE, as it isn't true.
And if it is not a truth bearer, it can't be true, so if we can show it true, it couldn't have been a non-truthbearer.

 This sentence is not true: "this sentence is not true"
IS TRUE BECAUSE THE SECOND SENTENCE IS NOT A TRUTH BEARER.
THIS CONFUSED THE HELL OUT OF TARSKI.

No, you have confused yourself, because you don't understand what Tarski is talking about, so you guessed and are insisting that your error mudt be right.

 This sentence is not true: "a fish"
IS TRUE BECAUSE THE SECOND SENTENCE IS NOT A TRUTH BEARER.
 

The problem arises because if the language L can express a statement like:
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X is defined to be ~True(L, X)
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 Proven to have an cycle in its evaluation sequence
thus not a freaking truth bearer.

Then your True predicate is just broken.
As Tarski PROVED that the sentece was formable in the language, and thus must be evaluated by the predicate.
Sorry, you are just proving your ignorance of what you are talking about.

 Is "a fish" True? No
Is "a fish" False? No
 

Then if True(L, X) is false, then X, since it is the negation of that, must be TRUE, which leads to a contradiction as we have just shown that True(L, x) just returned FALSE for a TRUE statement.
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Note, that the major part of the proof, that you tend to overlook, is showing that in the system L, based on the minimal requirements specified, that such a statement CAN be expressed.
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You "Logic" tryies to say that it needs to "Reject" the statement, but "rejection" is not a possible result, BY DEFINITION, non-true statements are just false, even if they are non-sense.
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 In other words you are too stupid to not reject
an incoherent definition.
 

No, YOU are the one that is too stupid to not rehect an incoherent definition.
That given the assumption that a Truth predicate exists, Tarski proves that a system with the defined and somewhat minimal requrements (to be really usable) can form the statement
x in L is defined as ~True(L, x)
Such a statement breaks the Truth predicate.
Thus, one of the following must be true:
1) There is not Truth Predicate in ANY system that meets those minimal requirements. (That trying to define such a thing is just incoherent).
2) That all logic systems that meet those minimal requirements are themselves incoherent (and thus logic is fundamentally broken or limited)
Given the choice, most logitians will give up the Truth Predicate to have the logic system that can do what they need.
IT seems, you think logic needs to be handcuffed to be just kindergarden level so you can have your precious "Truth Predicate" and "Completeness".
My guess is that is because you only understand kindergarden level logic, as shown by how you relate to Prolog.