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On 5/17/24 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:It does have an immutably correct notion of {true on the basisOn 5/17/2024 8:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In other words, you logic doesn't have an absolute idea of truth!!!>>>
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
>
You already admitted that True(L,p) and False(L,p) both return false.
This is the correct value that these predicates correctly derived.
Right, but that also means that we can show that True(L, true) returns false, which says your logic system is broken by being inconsistant.
>
Not at all. Your version of the Truth Teller paradox has
the conventional lack of a truth object as the Liar Paradox
and the Truth Teller paradox: What are they true about?
The object that made the statement true, was that True(L, p) said that p wasn't true.*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*No you said this* (Socratic question)>No, YOU don't understand that True MUST be a truth beared, or you are just a liar that your system has a Truth Predicate.
This sentence is true.
What is it true about?
It is true about being true.
What is it is true about being true about?
>
This turns out to be Kripke ungrounded yet Kripke did
not know the algorithmic basis for Kripke grounding.
>
*Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke* (1975)
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
>
>>>>
It seems that now you are now disagreeing with your own self. You are
saying the predicates are broken BECAUSE THEY RETURN THE CORRECT VALUE.
>
No, your logic system disagrees with itself, I am just pointing that out.
>
All that you pointed out is that you still don't understand
the Truth Teller paradox.
Remember, we started with
p in L is ~True(L, p)
you say True(L, p) is false
thus the truth value of p MUST be true, since it is not the falseness of True(L, p)We test p for True or False if neither it is tossed out on its ass.
Thus we can say that p is also the equivalent in L ofWe sure as Hell cannot correctly say that.
~True(L, ~True(L, p))~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
Which since we showed that True(L, p) was false, that means that the outer True predicate sees a true statement (since it is the negation of a false statement)~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
and thus True(L, ~True(L, p)) is true, and thus we can show that p must be false.By this same reasoning we can show that "a fish" must be false.
Thus we have a contradiction.*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
So, if you want to claim "Truth Teller Paradox", the only answer is to say that True(L, p) isn't actually a truth-bearer,
and thus it isn't a predicate, and you have lied that your system has one.--
>This is the problem with the assumption that a Truth Predicate exists, and is what Tarksi was pointing out, but which seems to be above your level of understanding.
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