Re: True on the basis of meaning --- Good job Richard ! ---Socratic method

On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/17/24 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/17/2024 9:40 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/17/24 10:19 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/17/2024 8:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/17/24 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/17/2024 8:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

>
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
>
You already admitted that True(L,p) and False(L,p) both return false.
This is the correct value that these predicates correctly derived.

>
Right, but that also means that we can show that True(L, true) returns false, which says your logic system is broken by being inconsistant.
>

>
Not at all. Your version of the Truth Teller paradox has
the conventional lack of a truth object as the Liar Paradox
and the Truth Teller paradox: What are they true about?

>
In other words, you logic doesn't have an absolute idea of truth!!!
>

>
It does have an immutably correct notion of {true on the basis
of meaning} and rejects finite strings as not truth bearers on
this basis.

>
Nope, because you said the value of "true" doesn't exist, truth is dependent on having something to make true.
>

>
True(L,x) is defined in terms of its truthmaker.

>
And create a contradiction.
>

 You have not shown that.
All you have shown is a failure to understand that the formalized
Truth Teller Paradox is not a truth bearer.
 

>

A whole bunch of expressions are stipulated to have the semantic
property of Boolean true. Being a member of this sat is what makes
them true.

>
and everything derivable from them with truth preserving operations, including the defined behavior of the True operator, and thus,
>

 This seems to indicate that when on non truth-bearer such as "a fish"
is neither true nor false you still want to process it.
 This indicates that you don't understand that when any expression
X is shown to be neither True nor False that X has proven to not
be a truth-bearer thus must be rejected as a type-mismatch error
for any system of bivalent logic.
 

>

>

The object that made the statement true, was that True(L, p) said that p wasn't true.
>

>
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*

>
Yes, which makes True(L, a sentence proven to be true) to be false.
>
Thus, it is inconsistant.
>

>
*It has nothing that it is true about so it is not true*
*It has nothing that it is true about so it is not true*
*It has nothing that it is true about so it is not true*

>
p is true, because True(L, p) being false made it so, since p was defined to be ~True(L, p)
>

 p is not a truth-bearer thus behaves the exact same way as any
other non-truth-bearer such as "a fish".
 

THIS is the "true" that True(L, p) has previously defined to be false,

 We cannot correctly say it that way because we a leaving
the definition of p as vague.
 On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
True(L, p) is false
False(L,p) is false
 Therefore p is not a truth-bearer and rejected as a type
mismatch error for any formal system of bivalent logic.
 

and thus your True predicate is shown to be inconsistant.
>

 It is not inconsistent and you have only shown your own lack
of understanding when attempting to support such claims.
 

>

Or we can use the arguement that since
>
p is ~True(L, p) which is false that p is alse

>
then "a fish" because ~True(English, "a fish") is false that
makes "a fish" false.

>
Why?
>

 I simply applied the same reasoning that you applied to
non-truth-bearer p to non-truth-bearer "a fish".
 *SINCE REPETITION SEEMS TO HELP YOU CONCENTRATE*
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
True(L, p) is false
False(L,p) is false
 Therefore p is not a truth-bearer and rejected as a type
mismatch error for any formal system of bivalent logic.
Likewise for "a fish".
 

True didn't make p true because it was an input to the Truth Predicate, but because p was defined as an expression based on it,
>
where was this done to "a fish".
>

p = "a fish"
True(L, p) is false
False(L,p) is false
Therefore p is not a truth-bearer and rejected as a type
mismatch error for any formal system of bivalent logic.
The same thing applies when p defined as ~True(L, p)
 

You are just proving you don't understand what is being talked about.
>

>

~True(L, ~True(L, p) which, since True(L, p) is "established" to be false, and thus ~True(L,p) to be true, we can say that True(L, ~True(L, p) must be true

>
*ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*

>
In other words, you logic doesn't understand how to handle references!
>

 *I AM NOT SURE IF YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS*
*I AM NOT SURE IF YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS*
*I AM NOT SURE IF YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS*
 As I have been saying for years:
LP := "This sentence is not true"
  True(English, LP) is false
False(English, LP) is false
Therefore LP is neither true nor false thus not a truth-bearer
that must be rejected from any bivalent system of formal logic.
 *Here is the next level of this*
  ~True(English, LP) is true
~False(English, LP) is true
  This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
This sentence is not false: "This sentence is not true" is true
 

Note, p is different than a statement that SAYS something about a sentence it mentions, p is defined by a predicate applied to a sentence (that happens to be itself).
>

 Forming an infinite evaluation cycle that is rejected by Prolog using:
https://www.swi-prolog.org/pldoc/man?predicate=unify_with_occurs_check/2
 My system rejects it a different way.
No sequence of true preserving operations applied to
expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p or ~p
 True xor False
Is Boolean and thus an element of a bivalent system of logic.
 True and False
Is inconsistent thus NOT an element of any bivalent system of logic.
 True nor False // {not or} output is true if both inputs are false.
Is not a truth-bearer thus NOT an element of any bivalent system of logic.
 

>

and thus p, being not that is false.
>
So, we can prove that p is both false and true, and thus your system is BY DEFINITION inconsistant.
>

>
We can prove that p is both false and true the exact same way
and to the exact same degree that "a fish" is both true and false.

>
How do you "prove" "a fish" to be true and false?
>

 By using the same incorrect reasoning that you applied to p
"We can prove that p is both false and true"
 

By your definitions it is neither.
>

Likewise for p
 

That is the difference between the statement p and a sentence that is trivially a non-truth-bearer (one that doesn't state something).
>

 TT := "This sentence is true"
TT := True(L, TT)
 

>
<snip>
>

*No you said this* (Socratic question)

>
No, YOU said it first, and I agreed.
>
What else are you going to make it?
>
(Socratic reply question)
>

>

thus the truth value of p MUST be true, since it is not the falseness of True(L, p)
>

>
We test p for True or False if neither it is tossed out on its ass.
>
It is like we are testing if a person is hungry:
We ask is the person dead? The answer is yes and then you
say what if they are still hungry?
>

>
RED HERRINBG.
>

>
p is dead!
Every expression that is neither true nor false
is dead to any system of bivalent logic.

>
Then so is your "predicate True".
>

 Not true and your every attempt to show this had glaring errors.
 

That is the problem you face, since p is DEFINED BY True, for p to be "dead", so must the idea of the existance of the predicate "True"
>

 TT := True(TT)
True(L, TT) is false
False(L, TT) is false
∴ TT is rejected as not a truth-bearer thus not
an element of any formal system of bivalent logic.
 The Truth Teller Paradox in all its forms is not
true ABOUT anything.
 

>

Since you have claimed that True(L, p) is false, by the stipulated definition of p,

>
Nope I never said that. You agreed that
>
There are no sequence of true preserving operations applied to
expressions that are stipulated to be true that derive p or ~p.

>
Right, which by your definition means that p can not be true.
>

 The exact same way that "a fish" is not a truth-bearer
thus must be rejected by any formal system of bivalent logic.
 

>
Likewise for "a fish",
"this sentence is not true" and
"this sentence is true".
>

it MUST be a true statement, and thus you have

>
Then you contradict yourself when you said
 >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > No, so True(L, p) is false

>
No, your system contradicts itself.
>

 You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox.

No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
If, as you claim p in L defined as ~True(L, p) results in True(L, p) being false, then p must be a true statement, and thus True(L, <a true statement>) has been claim to return false, and thus True has created a contradiction.

 

you system says that since, at least initially, we can not find a path to p or ~p, True(L, p) must be false.
>

 Likewise when we try a quadrillion different times
LP := ~True(L, LP) remains neither true nor false
thus not a truth-bearer thus not an element of any
formal system of bivalent logic.

Except that BY THE DEFINITION of the True predicate, as ALWAYS have a truth value, and not ('~') of a truth value is a truth value, your definiton of the LP MUST have a truth value and be a truth-bearer.
If you claim LP isn't a truth-bearer, then True(L, LP) isn't a truth-bearer and thus True has failed to be a precicate

 

But once we have the decision, we now have a path that makes p true, and thus True is forced into a contradiction.
>

 *If we did then we could make "a fish" true*

Only by the principle of explosion that you don't understand.

 There exists no such path for any non-truth-bearer.

But True deciding that no such path exists, creates one to the negation of True() value of the statement.

 All non-truth bearers must be immediately rejected by every formal
system of bivalent logic.

And the method that True has to do that is to return false.
You don't seem to understand that. True has only two option, declare a statement as true, or declare that it is not true, which means either false or not a truth-bearer.

 This same thing equally applies to every expression X such
that True(L,x) nor False(L,x)

Right, which is where to contradiction occurs.

 That you understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
is better than most professional philosophers that specialize
in truth-bearers and truth-makers. A leading author in this
field says that the Liar Paradox might not be true or false.

But the Liar Paradox built on a Truth Predicate MUST be a truth bearer, which creates a contradiction, so we can't have Truth Predicates.

 

>

stiplated that True(L, <a statement proven to be true>) turns out to be false (since that statement IS p), and thus you system is
>

>
*Illegal stipulation. It must come from here*
(a) A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
     model of the general knowledge of the actual world.

>
FALSE. Formal Logic has NOTHING to do about the actual world, but about the stipulations (via the axioms of the system).
>

 (a) A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
     model of the general knowledge of the actual world.
Such a system knows that {cats} <are> {animals}.
 

But there is no set of finite strings that form a accurate model of the properties of the actual world.

In fact, it is generally considered impossible to fully formalize the "actual world" as we would need to actually KNOW all the actual facts and relationships of the actual world.
>

 Only the facts of general knowledge of the actual world, context
specific details are not included yet can be provided as a discourse
knowledge ontology.

But if all knowledge has been stipulated,

 The general knowledge of the actual world is finite.
Every detail of the actual world is infinite.

No, because of known relationships, we can prove an infinte number of statements, and thus to encode ALL knowledge, requries an infinite set.

 

Formal logic allows us to define APPROXIMATE models of the "real world", to try to deduce new things about the "real world".
>

 A {cat} is not {approximately} an {animal}

Nope, but there are a number of "facts" that are only know to an approximation, some without even hard limits to the degree of approximation.

 

>

Thus we can say that p is also the equivalent in L of
>

>
We sure as Hell cannot correctly say that.

>
Why not?

>
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*

>
In other words, you system doesn't allow the assignement of a statement to have a refenece to itself, which is one of the criteria in Tarski.
>

>

~True(L, ~True(L, p))

>
~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is not true")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is true")) is true

>
Nope, "This statment is true" is different then the statement:
>
P, in L, is defined as ~True(L, P)

Yes that one is: "This sentence is not true"
>

>
It it just
>
P in L is defined as "P is not true."
>

The prior one is the ordinary Liar Paradox formalized.
>

The difference is the statement P is not true has the possibility of being a non-truth bearer, but the predicate True(L, p) doesn't have that option.
>

>
The predicate simple says True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false.
This is the same ESSENTIAL idea as Prolog unable to apply Rules to Facts to derive p or ~p.
>
The key difference is that my Facts are a complete and accurate model
of the general knowledge of the actual world...

>
Can't be. You don't have a complete and accurate model of the general knowledge of the actual world.
>

 A complete and accurate model of the general knowledge of
the actual world is finite and does exist. It will need to
be updated from time to time. Pluto is no longer considered
to be a planet.

The show it.

 

And to say you system is based on that just makes your system a lie.
>

 The set of general facts that the set of minds and the set of
writings knows does exist in these minds and writings. We only
need a very tiny subset of these to correctly reject all of the
common epistemological antinomies.

But that doesn't work.

 

>

>

>
Which since we showed that True(L, p) was false, that means that the outer True predicate sees a true statement (since it is the negation of a false statement)

>
~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true

>
Yep.
>

>

 and thus True(L, ~True(L, p)) is true, and thus we can show that p must be false.
>

>
By this same reasoning we can show that "a fish" must be false.

>
Nope, because a fish wasn't defined to be any of those sentencds.
>

>
"~True(L, p)" is merely a finite string input assigned to the variable named p. We could have as easily have assigned "a fish" to p.

>
Yes, but we didn't. And the string ~True(L, p) has semantic meaning.
>

 LP := ~True(L, LP) is simply the formalized liar paradox
and cannot exist in any formal system of bivalent logic.

But you just expressed it, so if True exists it needs to handle it.
That is your problem.

 

And the semantic meaning leads to a contradiction no matter how you assign a logical value to True(L, p),

 Not at all its logical value is false.
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?

But it True(L, p) is false, then since p is DEFINED as not True(L, p) then p must be true.
Do you not agree that the complement of a logical value of false is true?

 On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > No, so True(L, p) is false
 Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?
Why do you keep disagreeing with yourself on this?

Becaue your own logic system disagrees with you.

 *I am stopping here*
*I am stopping here*
*I am stopping here*
*I am stopping here*
*I am stopping here*
 

Good, because you don't understand what you are talking about.
You logic system has just been proved defective as it has contradicitons in it.