Re: Can there be a truth without a truthmaker?

On 04/06/2024 09:26 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 04/05/2024 09:44 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:

On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>

There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."

>
Which kind of truth is that statement?

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Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
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It seems you're just talking about the usual old logical positivism's
scientific demarcation, and the usual old idea that mathematics is
analytic while experience is empirical, then as with regards to
that you seem to be expressing that truth requires a greater theory,
that demands a theory of truth to be analytic, with regards to then
the usual milieu of science or scientism's expectations that the
epistemological is only empirical, vis-a-vis, that mathematics
and logic for example are analytic, so that there's a perceived
disconnect between the teleology of the analytic and the ontological
of the empirical, so that you need something like Kant's sublime
and Hegel's fuller dialectic, so that the theory is the wider theory,
while at the same time incorporates both the a priori and a posteriori.
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It's sort of like you're noticing that "prediction by falsifiability"
is an oxymoron, and that it's like empirical theory and scientific
truth were both oxymorons, and they made an oxymoron baby, and
that logical positivism that isn't a stronger logical positivism
and also a stronger mathematical platonism, was a bigger oxymoron.
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That said then there's an idea that something like a "Comenius
language" is the universe of the words, and analytic as it were,
while humans and other reasoners are yet finite creatures,
it's a usual notion of platonism and since antiquity,
only that logical positivism had such a jarring divorce
from metaphysics, that it yet is so that metatheory or
theory at all is still a branch of metaphysics and the
technical philosophy, that a sort of common silver thread
still connects a brief account of technical metaphysics,
with a philosophy of science, without which it is bereft of
context, it's a false dichotomy reason and metaphysics.
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So, a notion like a "Comenius language", is that it's only
truisms and sort of results from axiomless natural deduction,
and that it has no paradoxes because "the Liar" is only
an artifact or sputnik of quantification like Russell's
thesis and Russell's retro-thesis, then that things like
"Ex Falso Quodlibet plus material implication" are kicked
right out or down as "quasi-modal" anyways, that there's
at least an abstract model of analytic truth, yes.
>
>

Reading something like Gadamer, a philosopher after
the 20'th century, in for example his work "Plato"
he sort of summarizes that there is always a metaphysical
component, and it's our technical philosophy, or,
the, logico-philosophical if you will, it sort of
explains that logical positivism left itself without
a sort of leg to stand on, not that it need be fantastical,
but that actually there's a real and common object-sense,
so that intersubjectivity and relativity isn't all lost
in a world of interobjectivity and the absolute.
We're finite creatures, each, yet, finite doesn't only
mean subjective and relative, it also means objective
and absolute.
I.e., the result is "you know we thought it over and
logical positivism is of course a great exercise then
that to culminate in a strong and faithful logical
positivism only requires exactly a particular minimal
concomitant acknowledgment of a teleological for our
ontological the inter-subjective inter-objective,
then that science and axiomatics have a common theory
of truth.
That way we mere finite creatures can make an ontological
commitment because there already is one for itself,
and scientifically, and necessarily scientifically,
while yet profound.