Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context.

On 3/21/25 6:44 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/21/2025 2:30 PM, Keith Thompson wrote:

Richard Heathfield <rjh@cpax.org.uk> writes:

On 21/03/2025 08:11, Mikko wrote:
>
<snip>
>

Another part of human knowledge is that there are fools that try to
argue against proven theorems.

>
Well, if it ain't proven it ain't yet a theorem. But is that enough?
>
The background to the work of Church, Turing, Gödel and the like is
Hilbert's second problem: "The compatibility of the arithmetical
axioms", and the background to /that/ problem is that in the late 19th
century mathematicians were occasionally coming up with proofs of X,
only to discover in the literature that not-X had already been
proved. The question then was which proof had the bug?
>
But what if they were /both/ right? It was an obvious worry, and so
arose the great question: is mathematics consistent?
>
And Gödel proved not only that it isn't, but that it can't be.
>
Fortunately, to date inconsistency has tended to surface only in
corner cases like the Halting Problem, but Gödel's Hobgoblin hovers
over mathematics to this day.

>
My understanding is that Gödel proved that there are statements
that are true but not provable.  It's still not possible for both
X and not-X to be provable.  If proofs exist for both, at least
one of the proofs must be flawed.
>

>
It seems that the short version is that G can be
expressed in math yet cannot be linked to its
semantic meaning in math. We need meta-math for this.
>
In my system of the entire set of human general knowledge
that can be expressed in language G is linked to its
semantic meaning.
>
>

 No, G is fully connected with its BASIC semantics meaning in the language of math.