Re: What are the chances of this encrytion being broken?

On 24/03/2025 19:07, Stefan Claas wrote:
<snip>

I don't understand your rubberhose arguments, I must admit. If a sender
has a Government trojan on his device, no rubberhose is needed. If the
sender uses (without a Government trojan) anonymous Networks, which it
seems you guys are not using (yet), how would be rubberhose applied, if
they can't find the sender?

If they can't find Alice, they can have a quiet word with Bob.
Poor Bob.
So, I hear you ask, what if they can't identify /either/ of them?
But if they don't know who Alice and Bob are, what possible reason could they have for reading their mail? The security services don't begin an investigation by plucking 700 bytes from the ether on the off-chance that underneath some home-grown crypto it might say something like "attack at dawn".
No, they start with people, and people are very easy to kick the living daylights out of until they give up their algorithms and their keys.
--
Richard Heathfield
Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
"Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
Sig line 4 vacant - apply within