Re: What are the chances of this encrytion being broken?

On 3/24/2025 12:20 PM, Richard Heathfield wrote:

On 24/03/2025 19:07, Stefan Claas wrote:
 <snip>
 

I don't understand your rubberhose arguments, I must admit. If a sender
has a Government trojan on his device, no rubberhose is needed. If the
sender uses (without a Government trojan) anonymous Networks, which it
seems you guys are not using (yet), how would be rubberhose applied, if
they can't find the sender?

 If they can't find Alice, they can have a quiet word with Bob.
 Poor Bob.
 So, I hear you ask, what if they can't identify /either/ of them?
 But if they don't know who Alice and Bob are, what possible reason could they have for reading their mail? The security services don't begin an investigation by plucking 700 bytes from the ether on the off-chance that underneath some home-grown crypto it might say something like "attack at dawn".
 No, they start with people, and people are very easy to kick the living daylights out of until they give up their algorithms and their keys.
 

One scenario I can think of involves a computer that creates say, 2048 bytes of TRNG data, saves it to two sd cards. Then said computer is destroyed. Alice and Bob use that as a symmetric key. Bob get captured, but was able to destroy his sd card before Eve's agents got to it. Then Bob is royally screwed? He gets hit with the hose but truly does not know the password... Another Murphys law for Bob. No way out of the hourly beatings and sleep deprivations. No way to say this is the password because Bob never saw any of it? Is that kind of okay?