Re: When will they ever learn...

On 11/25/2024 6:33 AM, Don Y wrote:

On 11/25/2024 6:06 AM, Carlos E.R. wrote:

On 2024-11-25 13:41, Don Y wrote:

Bank tellers use a palm scanner.  (what happens when your SECOND palm
is compromised??)

>
What means compromised in this context?

 Someone is able to extract/copy the data that uniquely identifies YOUR
palm so they can fabricate a passable emulation of it and masquerade
as you (to whatever is authenticating "you").

Remember, the first thing you need is the "secret" that is being used
as an authenticator (e.g., the uniqueness of your palm).  Once you
have that, it is just a technical/logistical problem to figure out
how to introduce that to the mechanism doing the authenticating.
E.g., when I (tele)phone home, the phone number that I am calling
from, my voice, plus my responses to any challenges (though not
naively obvious as such:  "What is today's password?") is how I prove
to the house that I should be allowed access to certain abilities
that *others* should not be granted access.
[If you show up at the front door, then your face -- not a photo of
an authorized guest's head -- has to also match voice and challenges.]
Someone attempting to gain such access would have to spoof my
CID, voice AND the knowledge encoded in those challenges (What
did you eat for breakfast, TODAY?  What movie did you watch last
night? etc.  Data that an observer would find difficult to
deduce or anticipate from prior habits ("He ALWAYS has pancakes
for breakfast"  "His mother's maiden name is..."  "The name of his
first school is...")
E.g., when we set up 2FA at an institution (or a web site), we
use silly answers to those stock questions as they are not
easily guessable (or, researched, using on-line resources).
Maiden name:   237 centauri
First school:  green eggs and ham
Pet's name:    (*&(*&
After all, the authenticator is just looking for a string that you
have previously supplied.  It cares not if you are lying (unless
you speak to, e.g., a credit agency where they want to verify
data that they already have about you) so why confine your answers
to a truth that an adversary might be able to guess/deduce?
Answering truthfully is just a convenience for folks who
don't want to remember those deceptions.
If the token you use as an authenticator (password/phrase, fingerprint,
voice print, etc. is STATIC, then keeping control over it becomes
paramount.  How do you prevent someone from surreptitiously photographing
your face?  recording your voice (from which it is relatively easy to
recreate arbitrary dialog, on demand)?  "lifting" your fingerprints off
of a surface you've been observed as having touched?