Sujet : Re: Challenger
De : jl (at) *nospam* 650pot.com (john larkin)
Groupes : sci.electronics.designDate : 11. Jun 2024, 17:13:00
Autres entêtes
Message-ID : <oltg6jh79s1otgmo20d40a5t367hnf3l39@4ax.com>
References : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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On Tue, 11 Jun 2024 15:58:00 +0100, Martin Brown
<'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
On 10/06/2024 19:34, Phil Hobbs wrote:
bitrex <user@example.net> wrote:
On 6/9/2024 1:05 PM, Phil Hobbs wrote:
>
Sounds like an expanded rehash of the presidential commission report. For
the other side of the story, I highly recommend Diane Vaughans The
Challenger Launch Decision.
>
Cheers
>
Phil Hobbs
>
>
I think it's less about any particular individual's greed or will to
power but more about the dangers of formal "processes" in large
organizations which have become so large and ossified that the processes
become circular and self-referential.
>
In some particularly idiotic cases the processes don't have to become
particularly large or self-referential to cause disaster, the classic
"Well the designer signed off on the modifications to the plans so that
means they reviewed them and they're safe for the contractor to
implement.." "Wait, the designer signed off on them because they thought
the contractor had reviewed them...didn't they?" has definitely cost
lives before, and probably will again
Nah, it was much more careful and conscientious than that, and so even more
tragic.
>
I'm still inclined to believe that the suits pressured the engineers
into compliance with something that they were deeply uncomfortable with
- namely launching when the ambient temperature was so far below the
norm in Florida. They had a nationwide TV tie in and VIPs to impress.
The show must go on...
>
So they got a lot more of a spectacle than they had bargained for.
>
Likewise with the Columbia disaster where they essentially refused to
call in a favour off the military imaging kit operators that could have
looked at the vehicle's leading edge for signs of damage.
>
That time they convinced themselves that because it (foam impacts) had
happened before with no ill effects it would be OK again this time. ISTR
an intern was tasked with the first impact analysis. It did get
escalated but not far enough up the hierarchy to make a difference.
>
HST mirror by PE also suffered from a painstakingly exact measurement
process that created a fabulously smooth polished mirror using very
sophisticated methods but precisely figured to the wrong shape.
>
These things happen due to human fallibility and plain bad luck. The
backup Kodak mirror was correct in every detail but never flew.
>
Vaughan was expecting to find misconduct and evil capitalism, but her
research showed the opposite. Shes an honest and intelligent woman, so she
presented what she found in a compelling way, despite it being sociology.
;)
Folks like that dont grow on trees, which is why I recommend the book so
highly.
>
ISTR at least one Morton Thiokol engineer was begging them not to launch
with it so cold but was over ruled by more senior people in the end.
>
Big institutions tend to be immoral. Money and power dominate honest
engineers.
Remember "Don't be evil" ?
Rocket launches and landings are intrinsically dangerous. On this I am
inclined to agree with JL - unless and until we find something that our
robotic and AI kit cannot do we shouldn't be sending people into space.
>
It was the *only* way to explore the moon back in 1969 but not any more...
We coud have put robots on the moon in 1969. The astronauts were
mostly passive passengers anyhow.