Re: The Spanish Grid Drop-out - recently released information.

On 2025-05-10 18:46, Bill Sloman wrote:

One of my LinkedIn contacts - an IEEE contact in this case - posted some
new data on LinkedIn, from a "Simon Gallagher, Managing Director at UK
Networks Services | CEng | FIET | FEI | MBA "

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Today the ministry said that they have ruled out a hacking of the REE,
but not in other places. And that it originated in Granada, Badajoz and
Sevilla (loss of generation).
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Spanish:
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<https://www.eldiario.es/economia/aagesen-avanza-desconexiones-generacion-apagon-empezaron-granada-badajoz-sevilla_1_12297171.html>
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 Aagesen says that the generation disconnections before the blackout
began in Granada, Badajoz and Seville.
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    They began with a substation in Granada and then occurred in
Badajoz and Seville; the vice-president speaks of ‘overvoltage’
problems, rules out a cyber-attack on Red Eléctrica and stresses that
‘hypotheses have already been ruled out’: it was not a problem of
coverage, reserve ‘or the size of the networks’.
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The Third Vice-President and Minister for Ecological Transition, Sara
Aagesen, announced this Wednesday in the Congress of Deputies that the
generation losses prior to the historic blackout on 28 April ‘began in
Granada, Badajoz and Seville’. Aagesen, who confirmed that a
cyber-attack on Red Eléctrica has been ruled out, spoke of problems of
‘overvoltage’ in the system and explained that they are analysing
whether the oscillations detected in Europe half an hour before the cut
were related to the incident.
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In an appearance in the plenary session to explain the crisis, the
vice-president explained that, after ‘at least two periods of
oscillations’ in the 30 minutes prior to the blackout, which were
detected in the peninsular and European system, with “low” demand at
that time, there were ‘three losses’ of generation: the first, ‘in a
substation in Granada’ at 12 hours, 32 minutes and 57 seconds; 19
seconds later, another substation in Badajoz was disconnected; and 20.3
seconds later, another in Seville. ‘The sum of these three events’
accumulated a loss of just over 2.2 gigawatts ‘in 20 seconds’.
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 The committee investigating the blackout is analyzing “disconnections
that may be due to overvoltage as a triggering element of the cascading
drop” that came just after. The control systems of the different
operators reflect that that morning “recorded volatility in the
voltages”, previous: “Rises and falls” prior to that zero and those
oscillations. That is why they are analyzing “not only that morning”,
but also the days prior to the blackout.
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Aagesen explained that after these disconnections in these three
provinces, the synchronism with the European system was lost: the
interconnections with France jump, the Iberian Peninsula is isolated
from the rest of the continent and the “deregulation” occurs, that is,
the demand ceases to be fed. After disconnecting “the first step of
deregulation”, the frequency in the grid “continues to drop” and
“successive steps of deregulation” are activated in a short period of
time. At 12 hours, 33 minutes and 22 seconds “the sixth time step of
dredging” is activated and the system ends up collapsing to “peninsular
zero”.
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The Vice-president explained that the inter-ministerial committee that
is analyzing the causes of the incident, which has already held six
meetings and has a group dedicated to the electricity system and another
for cybersecurity, is analyzing “millions of data with the best
equipment on behalf of the Administration”. He stated that the
collaboration of the sector's agents is being “full”. Information has
been requested from more than thirty generation control centers,
distributors and aggregations of large generation productions above
1,000 megawatts.
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Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
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(... continues on the link)