Re: The Spanish Grid Drop-out - recently released information.

On 15/05/2025 13:43, Jeroen Belleman wrote:

On 5/14/25 23:35, Don Y wrote:

On 5/14/2025 7:16 AM, Glen Walpert wrote:

>
SCADA is used to monitor and control the grid, where control is done in
real time by adjusting the set points for real and reactive power at all
controlled power sources.  A small percentage of sources being
inaccessible degrades control by an insignificant amount.

I'll believe it is used to monitor the parameters at key locations in "realtime", update set points and try to reset tripped breakers.

"Real-time" means different things to different applications.
>
I took Theo's upthread suggestion to mean broadcasting a *reference*
that all genertors would track -- instead of using the actual power line,
itself.  I.e., the spain event could have been avoided if such a broadcast
reference were used by each generator DISREGARDING THE ACTUAL POWER SIGNAL.
[...]

Sounds like a perfect recipe to blow things up. No individual
generator can pretend to force the grid. Either they track
or they trip.

Pretty much guaranteed to cause trouble when the national grid is of a size and power level such that it behaves like a true transmission line even at 50/60Hz. ISTR it limits supergrid power handling to ~3GW max.
UK's peak N-S flow is limited by a "thermal constraint" on some insignificant location not far from where the new DC interconnector comes onshore. No explanation is given as to what that really means.

Driving power into the grid only makes sense in reference to
what is happening at the injection point.

Indeed. And smaller generation systems can just get crushed like flies if they try to stop a rampaging elephant as big GW systems drop offline.
If the system did fail due to local over voltage excursions somewhere and then failed to become stable again after a few suppliers dropped out then their network stability analysis must be appallingly bad.
--
Martin Brown