Re: Analytical truth redefined so that Quine can understand that bachelors are unmarried

On 03/20/2024 07:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
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Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
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Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
divided from other forms of truth:

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It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
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(1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and

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Truth is not a matter of definition.
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(2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
applying truth preserving operations.

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Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
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Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
all but affirmative sentences.
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I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
these Facts.

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By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
yield different analytical truths.
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The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
of human reasoning.
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Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
then there's the empirical and what results
why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
beliefs.
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I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
belief, then with regards to that not being,
"infallibilistic".
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This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
a major belief system historically,
is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
then that Russell who is secular, once joked
that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
extension infallible, and that's considered
fallacious, and specious.
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So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
the entire world is specious.
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The human reasoning then these days is that
we have an entire philosophy of science, and
the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
side the examination of reason of being by reason
in being, examination and test, and ontology from
the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
to those being among the usual concepts and
exploring the fuller dialectic including
deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
fundamental.
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It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
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When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
their truths aren't common, that's to be
considered from the universe of syllogism,
that they all have to be commonly true together,
and that involves that things change and so
that the modality is a temporality, and all
else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
which makes a statistical interpretation,
which makes a scientific interpretation.
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Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
there's an opposite, for any stipulation
there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
so that there's no default certification
of stipulation, and it results rather
that our canon and dogma and doctrine
guides our conscience, the logical conscience
and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
formalists and a common world of logical
and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
at all.
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This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
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Matters of definition ....
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It seems that instead what you have there
is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
statements of fact collected as common sense",
and this means specifically in the notion
that it is the _senses_ that describe the
phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
relation to the noumenological, then as with
regards to usually a platonistic world where
the only common truths are purely logical and
by extension mathematical, while all else is
only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
for a conscientious philosophy of science,
interpretations for considerations what so
result statistical and scientific experiment.
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So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
is contingent the lineage of its body
of definition, in matters of definition.
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"Anybody who buys or sells material implication
is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
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So, "an ontology via specification and
various graphical relations", isn't much
more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
that if that's codified in the reasoning its
beliefs, has that humans examine and test
their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
the non-logical is always contingent,
that otherwise is just a bot.
("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
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Then it's "matter of definition" as with
regards to matters of expectation, with regards
to matters of communication, what result
rather generally systems of information.
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Aristotle says "syllogisms don't have a common truth",
but that's just that "there are common truths syllogisms
don't have".
Syllogisms aren't facts so much as scratch-pads.
The "secular" is one of those words like
"entropy" and "entropy", Aristotle's "down"
or Leibniz' "full", or like constructivism and
intuitionism, when what's old is new again,
and this kind of thing, the "secular" and
"non-secular".
It's similar in this way to "objective" and
"subjective", those relating matters of
contingency and immediacy, and those
changing in the temporal modality,
by each monad in the monadic modality,
each monad's context what's what,
relative, this absolute.
So, "forging a common belief", or basically
establishing "this bag-of-fact is the immutable
common sensory apparatus of a world of bots",
still has that each little meat-bag wet-ware or
otherwise any reasoning apparatus, basically
still has its own sense of being, or not, that
basically humans are individuals, vis-a-vis,
what's called the "hive-mind", with regards
to personality and this kind of thing.
Human rights are individual rights.
Then, monism is a great idea that there's
an objective, distinct universe of objects
that all monads, being independent actors
or agents and usually indicated as a distinct
"spark", all inhabit one universe, that with
univocity and this kind of thing, makes for
what's according to the canon and doctrine
and dogma, what's usually called platonism,
with regards to the existence of ideals, then
these days for example a "mathematical
universe hypothesis", as sort of extending
that to what's "real" as well.
Monism is great, it's an _idea_.
Theism of course or rather deism,
is super-scientific.  There's always
room, and, of course in humans there
are religions with respect to deism, or
common belief systems, including where
matters of faith confound expectations
of belief, those are religions in the secular
and non-secular, including the secular and
non-secular whose faith and belief is that
there's agnosticism or a-theism, for example,
just to indicate that matters of faith and belief,
are external to any bag-of-fact, yet as well
can be modeled their reasonings, first-class,
the reasonings, as a bag-of-facts itself,
or "comparative religion".
So, "comparative belief", and, "comparative faith",
indicate what's entertainable and what's inviolable,
with regards to belief systems, a monad's modality's
temporality's state of belief (and suspension thereof).
Now of course logical positivism keeps things simple,
and we relate things to the phenomenological and
the empirical, but a stronger or "greater" logicism,
stronger positivism, strong mathematical platonism
then stronger platonism, for holistic monism,
arrives at that the phenomenological is ephemeral,
it's subjective, vis-a-vis, the objective,
for objectivity.
Then it results that there's a sort of minimal
reasoning toolkit, which involves these other,
noumenal, "senses":
object-sense
word-sense
number-sense
time-sense
continuum-sense
that basically make for that a monad's monistic
reasoning, results in terms of those, that their
inputs are both the phenomenological sense
and the first-class inputs according to, "theory",
which makes for any old "A Theory", at all,
then with regards to the secular and non-secular
that deism is super-scientific,
and religions are systems of belief.
And systems of belief reference matters of faith.
"Fundamentals", "foundations",
"systems of belief", these kinds things.
It's a usual idea in the respect of religion,
that deism is super-scientific,
and humans are individuals.
Not so much "a cult of one".