Re: Analytical truth redefined so that Quine can understand that bachelors are unmarried

On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
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Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
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Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
divided from other forms of truth:

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It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
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(1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and

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Truth is not a matter of definition.
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(2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
applying truth preserving operations.

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Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
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Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
all but affirmative sentences.
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I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
these Facts.

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By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
yield different analytical truths.
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The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
of human reasoning.
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Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
then there's the empirical and what results
why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
beliefs.
I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
belief, then with regards to that not being,
"infallibilistic".
This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
a major belief system historically,
is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
then that Russell who is secular, once joked
that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
extension infallible, and that's considered
fallacious, and specious.
So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
the entire world is specious.
The human reasoning then these days is that
we have an entire philosophy of science, and
the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
side the examination of reason of being by reason
in being, examination and test, and ontology from
the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
to those being among the usual concepts and
exploring the fuller dialectic including
deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
fundamental.
It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
their truths aren't common, that's to be
considered from the universe of syllogism,
that they all have to be commonly true together,
and that involves that things change and so
that the modality is a temporality, and all
else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
which makes a statistical interpretation,
which makes a scientific interpretation.
Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
there's an opposite, for any stipulation
there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
so that there's no default certification
of stipulation, and it results rather
that our canon and dogma and doctrine
guides our conscience, the logical conscience
and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
formalists and a common world of logical
and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
at all.
This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
Matters of definition ....
It seems that instead what you have there
is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
statements of fact collected as common sense",
and this means specifically in the notion
that it is the _senses_ that describe the
phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
relation to the noumenological, then as with
regards to usually a platonistic world where
the only common truths are purely logical and
by extension mathematical, while all else is
only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
for a conscientious philosophy of science,
interpretations for considerations what so
result statistical and scientific experiment.
So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
is contingent the lineage of its body
of definition, in matters of definition.
"Anybody who buys or sells material implication
is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
So, "an ontology via specification and
various graphical relations", isn't much
more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
that if that's codified in the reasoning its
beliefs, has that humans examine and test
their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
the non-logical is always contingent,
that otherwise is just a bot.
("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
Then it's "matter of definition" as with
regards to matters of expectation, with regards
to matters of communication, what result
rather generally systems of information.