Re: How the US won in both theaters of WWII

The subject issue of the quoted article entitled "Trump and the Future
of American Power" is, of course, about the Future of American Power.
For forever reason, Stephen Kotkin suggests an alternative
interpretation on WWII. Rather than the common US understanding that
it's involvement had saved Europe from Hilter and Asia from Imperial
Japan. Kotkin the historian sees involvement as more limited.
How about US role in post WWII global development? The following is the
question and Kotkin's answer.
[Question:]"Earlier this year, you wrote this in Foreign Affairs: “The
supreme irony of American grand strategy for the past 70 years is that
it worked, fostering an integrated world of impressive and shared
prosperity, and yet is now being abandoned. The United States was open
for business to its adversaries, without reciprocation. Today, however,
so-called industrial policy and protectionism are partially closing the
country not just to rivals but also to U.S. allies, partners, friends,
and potential friends. American policy has come to resemble
China’s—right when the latter has hit a wall.”
How does Trump fit into that story?
[Kotkin:] Well, we weren’t ready for our success. The goal was to create
this open global system that everyone could join and prosper from: a
liberal international order. And it was going to be amazing for
everybody. And they could join on a voluntary basis, not through some
coercive “spheres of influence” approach. And they were going to get
wealthy; they were going to go from poor to middle income. Win-win.
And it worked. It happened. It’s stunning how many people around the
world benefited from this U.S.-led order, including in America. And
we’re not just talking about China; we’re also talking about India. It’s
our neighbors, too, in Mexico. And it’s the developed world, as well, to
a certain extent: Japan and Germany, the two enemies of World War II,
became our closest allies and the second- and third-largest economies.
There’s never been a geopolitical turnabout bigger than that.
So it worked, but we’re not ready for this success. It turns out that
well, geez, you know, these other countries, they want a voice. They’re
not just going to become middle-income countries and continue to be told
what to do. They want international institutions that reflect their
achievements, their hard work, their entrepreneurialism, their creation
of middle classes, their place in the world. They’re justifiably proud
countries. And we don’t know how to accommodate their aspirations. The
conventional argument is seductive: the liberal order is supremely
flexible and can accommodate everybody, and so therefore it’s going to
survive. But it doesn’t work in the Iranian case, it doesn’t work in the
Russian case, and it doesn’t work in the Chinese case. What are the
terms of the accommodation? They see themselves, in several cases, as
rooted in ancient civilizations that predate the U.S.-led order. What if
they don’t accept our terms, even if they’re the beneficiaries?"
What's wrong with the above Q and A?
IF post WWII American grand strategy has worked, why and for how long?