An Israeli Order in the Middle East
A Chance to Defeat the Iranian Vision for the Region—and Improve on the
American Vision
Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov
December 17, 2024
Israeli military vehicles in the Golan Heights, December 2024
Israeli military vehicles in the Golan Heights, December 2024 Jamal Awad
/ Reuters
Amos Yadlin is Founder and President of MIND Israel. He is a retired
Major General in the Israeli Air Force and served as the head of
Israel’s Defense Intelligence from 2006 to 2010.
Avner Golov is Vice President of MIND Israel. From 2018 to 2023, he was
a Senior Director on Israel’s National Security Council.
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What is happening in the Middle East today is best understood as a
struggle over a new regional order. Since the Hamas attack on Israel on
October 7, 2023, three competing visions for that order have emerged and
then faltered: the Hamas vision, the Hezbollah-Iranian vision, and the
American vision. Hamas sought to ignite a multifront war aimed at
destroying Israel. Iran, along with its proxy Hezbollah, aimed for a war
of attrition that would cause Israel to collapse and push the United
States out of the region. The United States, which stood firmly behind
Israel, hoped for regional stability built on new political
possibilities for the Israelis and the Palestinians, normalization
between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and a defense pact between Washington
and Riyadh.
None of these visions, however, proved tractable: Hamas, Hezbollah, and
Iran misjudged the strength of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israeli
society, and the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The United States overestimated
its capacity to influence Israel’s approach to the war in Gaza and did
not sufficiently contend with the regional threat posed by Iran.
The failure of these three visions creates an opening for a more
realistic fourth one: an Israeli vision. Over the past three months,
Israel has begun to exert its power to reshape the Middle East. It
eliminated Hamas’s military capabilities and—shattering its own
long-standing approach to deterrence—decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership
and compelled the Lebanon-based group to accept cease-fire terms it had
long resisted, leaving Hamas isolated and Iran without its most capable
proxy. Israel has also carried out sophisticated strikes inside Iran.
The opportunistic toppling of the Assad regime in Syria at the hands of
rebel forces can be understood, in part, as an attempt to take advantage
of Israel’s undermining of Iranian regional power. As a result, Iran has
lost the land corridor stretching from its borders to Israel’s, a
corridor that Iran had devoted significant resources to establishing
over the past four decades.
These developments mark a dramatic shift: for nearly a year after the
October 7 attack, Israel’s vision for the region’s future was unclear.
It was defending itself and, by extension, fighting to preserve a status
quo that would never be reestablished. Although its operations were
aggressive, Israel refrained from disrupting the existing deterrence
dynamics with Hezbollah and Iran. Moreover, it hesitated to impose a new
order while it was viewed as an instigator internationally and while
divisions weakened Israeli society domestically.
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Israel is now reshaping the Middle East through military operations, but
it would benefit from asserting itself politically, too. It has both the
opportunity and the responsibility to steer the region’s trajectory
toward a new, more peaceful and sustainable reality. Currently, Israel’s
ability to force regional changes militarily outpaces its readiness to
articulate and enact a cohesive strategic vision; its operational
successes do not, as yet, have clear strategic ideas to go along with
them. Israel should push for a political framework to match its
battlefield successes. An Arab-Israeli coalition backed by the United
States could repel threats from Shiite and Sunni radicals, provide the
Palestinians with a realistic political future, safeguard Israel’s
security interests, secure the return of the Israeli hostages still in
Gaza, and prevent another attack on Israeli soil.
Israel must not seek to impose its vision of a new regional order alone.
It needs buy-in from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and
the United Arab Emirates, as well as Germany and the United Kingdom,
even as U.S. foreign policy undergoes its own realignment under
President-elect Donald Trump. The situation is delicate. But for the
first time since the October 7 attack, Israel has the opportunity to
seize the moment.
BEST-LAID PLANS
When Yahya Sinwar, the late Hamas leader, ordered an invasion of Israel
on October 7, 2023, he did so with a calculated vision for the Middle
East: immediately after Hamas’s attack, he anticipated a coordinated
assault from all Iranian-backed militant groups in the region, which
would in turn inspire Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank to
launch a new intifada. Sinwar’s plan relied on the participation of
Hezbollah and other members of the Iranian-backed “axis of resistance”
and even of Iran itself, ultimately leading to the complete military
defeat of Israel.
But Sinwar severely misjudged regional dynamics. On October 8, although
Hezbollah declared its support for Hamas and began shelling Israeli
towns, its actions were limited. Shiite militias from Iraq and Syria
launched rockets and drones to disrupt Israel’s advanced air defense
systems, but these efforts posed no significant threat to them. The
Houthis in Yemen joined the assault by targeting ships in the Red Sea
and launching missiles at Israeli cities. The Syrian dictator Bashar
al-Assad facilitated Iranian arms transfers to Lebanon but notably
stopped Iranian militias from attacking Israel from Syrian territory and
did not involve the Syrian army in the conflict, despite facing pressure
to do so from Iran. Hezbollah did not invade Israeli territory, focusing
instead on distracting the IDF in the north to divert its attention from
Gaza. Additionally, Sinwar’s hoped-for Palestinian uprising did not
materialize, in part because of the IDF’s rapid and effective deployment
to areas of the West Bank with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
presences. Meanwhile, Israel applied intense force in Gaza, killing
thousands of Hamas fighters and, eventually, Sinwar himself.
Israel’s decision to engage in a prolonged war initially emboldened Iran
and Hezbollah. They saw the conflict as an opportunity to assert their
regional hegemony. Unlike Hamas, whose goal was Israel’s outright
destruction, Iran sought, more modestly, to improve its regional
standing. By sustaining a multifront war of attrition against Israel,
Tehran aimed to increase the pressure on Israeli society and amplify the
costs of the war. With the United States focused on its strategic
competition with China and the war in Ukraine, Iran anticipated that
Washington would further withdraw from the region.
Sinwar severely misjudged regional dynamics.
The initial Israeli response to the Hezbollah-Iranian strategy appeared
cautious. Israel evacuated northern communities to create a security
buffer instead of invading Lebanon to directly counter Hezbollah’s
missile attacks, effectively allowing Hezbollah to continue its strikes.
Additionally, although the United States publicly backed Israel, Western
governments largely failed to impose significant costs on the
Iranian-backed axis of resistance. Their inability to stop the militant
Houthis in Yemen from interfering with Red Sea maritime traffic
emboldened the group to escalate its attacks on Israel. International
pressure constrained Israel’s ability to decisively defeat Hamas and
fueled Sinwar’s hope that Israel would not be able to sustain the
fighting for long. These factors combined to create the perception among
Iran and its allies that Israel might eventually find itself isolated,
economically drained, and exhausted. This idea was reinforced when, in
April, Iran launched an unprecedented missile and drone attack directly
from its own territory against Israel. Iranian leaders celebrated
Israel’s measured response—and the ongoing political turmoil inside
Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government pursued policies
that prolonged the war, strained the economy, and intensified
polarization, giving the upper hand to Israel’s enemies.
Meanwhile, the United States continued its pursuit of a Middle East
strategy built on the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations
between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates. After
October 7, Washington pressed Saudi Arabia to finalize a defense pact
tied to normalization with Israel and reasserted its belief in a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Biden
administration sought to leverage the war to create a stronger
pro-American coalition in the Middle East, shoring up Washington’s
influence and creating a more integrated regional economic hub linking
Europe and the Indo-Pacific in its competition with China.
But the U.S. plan failed to adequately address the threat from an
emboldened Iran or assuage the concerns of the United States’ junior
partners. Saudi Arabia declined to normalize ties with Israel as the war
in Gaza persisted, particularly as Israel refused to commit to a
two-state solution—a move that would be interpreted by Israel’s enemies
in the region as a victory for Hamas. Netanyahu, for his part, chose to
delay ending the war’s intense phase, waiting instead for the outcome of
the U.S. presidential election in the hope of a Republican victory.
Trump’s election, he believed, would lessen U.S. oversight over its
campaign against Hamas. With the Democrats’ loss in November, the United
States’ strategy in the Middle East has been thrown into doubt. Despite
all of Washington’s power and leverage, the American vision for a new
regional order, reasonable though it may have seemed, has proved
similarly infeasible to those of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.
EMPTY THRONE?
In September, the prevailing winds in the Middle East began to shift.
After 11 months in which the Israeli government set no objectives in the
northern theater, the Israeli cabinet added the safe return of Israel’s
northern residents to their homes as a formal war objective. The war had
already begun to shift northward, provoked by Hezbollah’s late July
rocket attack on a soccer field in the Golan Heights, which killed 12
children and injured over 40. In response, Israel assassinated Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah’s deputy, Fuad Shukr, and targeted Hezbollah’s
command structure with a humiliating operation. Explosives planted in
the organization’s pagers ignited simultaneously, killing and maiming
scores of operatives. Then Israel launched a series of airstrikes that
destroyed approximately 3,000 rockets and cruise missiles, and killed
Hezbollah’s leadership, including Nasrallah. These acts restored some of
the IDF’s lost prestige.
To retaliate, Iran launched a direct attack on Israel on October 1,
firing 181 ballistic missiles. But this hail of munitions caused only
limited damage to three Israeli sites: the Mossad compound in Glilot and
two Israeli air force bases in the south. This time, Israel organized a
larger response than it had in April, deploying 150 aircraft to strike
20 significant targets in Iran. The strikes showcased the asymmetry in
the two countries’ military capabilities: Iran launched many missiles
with limited results, but the IDF accurately hit high-value targets,
including Iran’s S-300 antiaircraft systems and a nuclear weapons
research facility in Parchin. The campaign demonstrated the
vulnerability of Iran’s most valuable energy and nuclear sites, should
the Iranian regime choose to escalate further. Since then, despite
repeated threats, Iran has not launched another direct attack on Israel.
On November 24, Israel and Lebanon, with the approval of Iran and
Hezbollah, signed a cease-fire agreement, which has largely held. That
same day, Syrian rebels backed by Turkey initiated a military operation
against the Assad regime. In less than two weeks, the rebels reached
Damascus and declared a new government, with minimal resistance from
Syrian, Russian, or Iranian forces or from Hezbollah. Instead of
consolidating Iran’s hegemony, the war has dealt a significant blow to
its regional standing.
The cease-fire in Lebanon and the unfolding situation in Syria have
created a leadership vacuum in the Middle East. Israel’s military
achievements present an opportunity to form a new coalition capable of
reshaping the region’s future and to offer an alternate reality of
peace, stability, and prosperity.
COALITION OF THE WILLING
Israel must build on its operational triumphs by clarifying and pursuing
a coherent strategic vision of a moderate regional alliance between
Israel and the Sunni Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia. It must address
key security threats, foremost among them Iran, and present a unified
front against Turkey’s and Qatar’s attempts to bolster the Muslim
Brotherhood’s influence in the Arab world, a task made all the more
urgent following the collapse of the Assad regime. Finally, the
coalition must offer the Palestinians a political future while
safeguarding Israel against future terrorist attacks.
Israel is now in a strong position to make real progress on bringing
this outcome to fruition. But it cannot do so alone. It needs the United
States to lead the complex effort and an Arab partnership to provide
legitimacy in the Middle East and transform its vision into an effective
regional force. The first step: Israel should convene a summit with the
United States, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab
Emirates, and any actors aspiring to help reshape the Middle East,
including Palestinian representatives, in a leading Middle Eastern
capital such as Riyadh. Its objectives would include establishing a
U.S.-Arab-Israeli alliance based on a shared regional vision; advancing
the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia (and, ideally,
additional countries such as Oman and Indonesia); creating a new
regional security framework; and establishing a road map for a Gaza free
of Hamas through a deradicalization campaign. The plan should also aim
to increase the Gulf states’ footprint in Syria to reduce the influence
of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood in the country.
The regional vision must also include a Palestinian component, following
an agreement on a cease-fire in Gaza that facilitates the return of all
Israeli hostages. The summit must establish a political future for the
Palestinians distinct from past approaches taken by Arab states and the
United States, which focused on a two-state solution. Instead, the
alliance should emphasize a flexible, long-term transition in which the
Palestinians demonstrate effective governance and actively work to
eliminate the influence of the most radical factions from Palestinian
society.
Israel has reasserted its ability to shape Middle Eastern politics
and security.
Furthermore, Arab leaders must agree that Gaza’s reconstruction by the
alliance will proceed only after the territory is fully demilitarized,
at which point Israel must commit to withdrawing the IDF. Before then,
the IDF must retain the ability to establish a security buffer zone
within Gaza along the border with Israel to prevent any potential Hamas
military buildups.
The United States should oversee a well-monitored transition to
effective governance in Gaza by an Arab-led Palestinian committee that
recognizes Israel as a Jewish state, eliminates terrorism, ceases
payments to terrorists, and promotes deradicalization within Palestinian
society as well as in international forums. It should also work with
Egypt to devise a strategy for securing the Egyptian-Gazan border to
prevent Hamas’s rearmament.
These Israeli conditions would align with U.S. and Arab interests,
particularly those of the Gulf states, which seek an end to the war in
Gaza and understand that a viable Palestinian state is currently
unrealistic, but recognize the importance of providing the Palestinians
with a political horizon to advance regional goals, such as countering
Iran, combating the Muslim Brotherhood, and enhancing economic and
technological cooperation with Israel.
The summit should aim to accelerate the development of a permanent
regional defense architecture. Dedicated task forces led by U.S. Central
Command, the IDF, and the militaries of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates would address air and missile defense,
secure maritime navigation, counter terrorism from Shiite and Sunni
extremists, and enhance intelligence sharing. Israel and the United
States must work especially hard to align their strategies to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It is increasingly crucial that
credible deterrence be established, because the weakening of Iran’s
proxy network makes nuclearization a more attractive option.
ON THE SAME PAGE
It is in the interests of both Israel and its regional partners that the
incoming Trump administration remains committed to the Middle East and
willing to use force to guarantee the security of its allies and deter
shared adversaries. This commitment to defending the region may face
opposition from factions within the administration that have advocated
for reducing U.S. international involvement. Trump has signaled that the
United States would not intervene in Syria and has indicated a desire to
complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria at a time when
Russia’s and Iran’s positions have weakened.
Hamas’s shock attack on October 7 appeared to prove that Israel had far
less control over the trajectory of its region than it had imagined. And
for almost a year, Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza suggested the same. Over
the past three months, Israel has reasserted its ability to shape Middle
Eastern politics and security. Without brave leadership, however,
Israel’s opportunity could slip away. Aspirations of extreme members of
Netanyahu’s coalition to annex parts of Gaza and the West Bank, impose
military rule in Gaza, or pursue a polarizing domestic agenda that
weakens democratic institutions will severely hinder this progress.
An Israeli government that advances the proposed vision will garner the
support of the majority of its citizens and is more likely to strengthen
Israel’s regional standing. Conversely, a government that does not curb
its own extremist rhetoric and actions will only pave the way for an
expanded regional conflict with no realistic end game—and play into the
hands of the Iranian regime.
Sinwar and Iran’s leaders recognized the war’s potential to reorder the
Middle East. Israel should settle for nothing less. But it must use its
power swiftly and wisely. Only a vision for the region that addresses
the threats posed by Iran, advances regional integration, and
establishes a political horizon for the Palestinians, supported by a
coordinated plan backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates, can leverage Israel’s military success against
Iran to accomplish a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous Middle East
and capitalize on the opportunities that will emerge in the war’s wake.
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[Jewish] Reshaping the Middle East