Re: Making your mind up

On Sat, 13 Apr 2024 14:41:16 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:

On 12/04/2024 13:56, Martin Harran wrote:

On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
 

On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:

On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:

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As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.

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Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?

Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?

And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).

Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.

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Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)

 
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
 
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?

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Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.

I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.

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The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
also continued bearing fruit. Antonio Damasio for example who wrote
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.

Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain.  He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.

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The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
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Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).
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Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.

What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,

"Big data is not knowledge …

 … Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of
information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological
barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."

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I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.

OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the
contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)

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Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.

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I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.

Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI,  is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain. It should be a two way-process, however,  and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)

I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it
already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a
rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
 

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