Re: Making your mind up

On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:

Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:

On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
 

On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
 

On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
 

On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
 

On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
 

On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]

 
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
 
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
 
That is predetermination at work.  Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
 

So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?

 
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
 

OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.

 
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
 

And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.

 
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
 

Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".

 
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
 

You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".

 
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something
resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not
ascribing that viewpoint to you.
 

I misinterpreted your post; my bad.

 
No problem.

 
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that
some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term,
gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
 

Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
that is correct.

 
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?

 

It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.

 
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
What would be the restriction?

 

The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one,  based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
>

How would random events support free will?
>

I believe that what I wrote above covers that.

>

--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
 the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov