Re: Making your mind up

On Sat, 4 May 2024 00:53:32 +0200, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me>:

On 04/05/2024 00:19, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Fri, 3 May 2024 18:14:17 +0200, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me>:
 

On 03/05/2024 17:24, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
>

Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:

On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
>

On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:

On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
>

How does
this allow for "something resembling choice" >>>>> It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed

and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.

>
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
What would be the restriction?

>

The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one,  based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
>

How would random events support free will?
>

I believe that what I wrote above covers that.

>
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which
randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and
determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
>

The randomness isn't in the choice, but in the ability of
the universe to act other than as clockwork. If the universe
were clockwork, a la Newton, free will would be a
meaningless concept, since everything would proceed directly
from prior conditions, with no room for any sort of actual
choice. Since it's not, but probabilistic instead, there's
room for actual choice (or decisions, if you prefer. How it
works? Damfino; my comment was strictly about possibilities.

>
You keep saying that randomness leaves "room for" actual choice or
decisions but don't engage with the arguments that what it leaves room
for aren't "choice" or "decisions".
>

I'll have to take your word for that; I have no idea what
that leads to, and how it affects the possibility of free
will being a valid idea.

>
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do
a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a
mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.

--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
 the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov