Re: Incorrect requirements --- Computing the mapping from the input to HHH(DD)

On 5/11/2025 7:33 PM, wij wrote:

On Sun, 2025-05-11 at 18:08 -0500, olcott wrote:

On 5/11/2025 5:50 PM, wij wrote:

On Sun, 2025-05-11 at 17:30 -0500, olcott wrote:

On 5/11/2025 5:11 PM, wij wrote:

On Sun, 2025-05-11 at 17:00 -0500, olcott wrote:
[cut]

ZFC corrected the error in set theory so that
it could resolve Russell's Paradox. The original
set theory has now called naive set theory.
>
I corrected the error of the HP that expects
HHH to report on behavior that is different
than the behavior that its input actually
specifies.

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Specificly, "Halt(D)=1 iff D() halts" is an error?
And it should expect: Halt(D)=1 iff POOH(D)=1 (correct problem)?
>

>
Yes that is an error because the behavior that
the input to HHH(DDD) specifies is the behavior
that HHH must report on.

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If so, how do we know a given function e.g. D, halts or not by giving it to H,
i.e. H(D)? Wrong question (according to you)?

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H and D is too vague and ambiguous.
We know that the input to HHH(DDD) specifies
a non-halting sequence of configurations.
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We know that the input to HHH1(DDD) specifies
a halting sequence of configurations.
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Instead, every time we want to know whether D halts or not,

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When we intentionally define an input to attempt
to thwart a specific termination analyzer THIS DOES
CHANGE THE BEHAVIOR.
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If we let people run uploaded programs on our
network we need to know if these programs are
going to halt.
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Unless HHH(DDD) rejects its input as non-halting
HHH will continue to eat up network resources.

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But, according to POOH, if D going to eat up network resources, it have to
happen when we run POOH(D), because you said D's halting property only
valid to H.
>

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If we want to prevent this kind of denial of service
attack HHH must be able correctly handle inputs that
are trying to thwart it or HHH fails.
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When HHH is our official denial of service attack
preventer it either rejects its input DDD as non
halting or it gets stuck in recursive emulation
thus fails.
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It always has been the requirement that a termination
analyzer was required to report on the behavior that
its input actually specifies.
>
This is a subtle nuance of functions computed by
models of computation that no one bothered to
pay attention to because they didn't know it made
any difference.
>

 Is DDD a virus?
 

If on a real system an input tried to fool the
denial-of-service-attack detector IT WOULD FAIL.
Prior to my work a denial-of-service-attack detector
WOULD FAIL. It would not know to reject DDD.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer