Re: True on the basis of meaning --- Good job Richard ! ---Socratic method

On Tue, 2024-05-14 at 07:31 -0400, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/13/24 11:36 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/13/24 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/13/2024 6:18 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 11:41 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 8:07 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 6:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 7:22 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 6:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 6:56 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 5:40 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 5:54 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 3:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 2:36 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 1:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 2:06 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 1:19 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 10:33 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-05-12 14:22:25 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 5/12/2024 2:42 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-05-11 04:27:03 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 5/10/2024 10:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/10/24 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/10/2024 10:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/10/24 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:

The entire body of expressions that are
{true on the basis of their
meaning} involves nothing more or less
than
stipulated relations between
finite strings.
 

 
You do know that what you are describing
when applied to Formal Systems are the
axioms of the system and the most
primitively provable theorems.
 

 
YES and there are axioms that comprise the
verbal model of the
actual world, thus Quine was wrong.

 
You don't understand what Quite was talking
about,
 

 
I don't need to know anything about what he was
talking about
except that he disagreed with {true on the
basis or meaning}.
I don't care or need to know how he got to an
incorrect answer.
 

 

 
You don't seem to understand what "Formal
Logic" actually means.
 

 
Ultimately it is anchored in stipulated
relations between finite
strings (AKA axioms) and expressions derived
from applying truth
preserving operations to these axioms.

 
Which you don't seem to understand what that
means.
 

 
I understand this much more deeply than you do.

 
In and about formal logic there is no valid deep
understanding. Only
a shallow understanding can be valid.
 

 
It turns out that ALL {true on the basis of
meaning} that includes
ALL of logic and math has its entire foundation
in relations between
finite strings. Some are stipulated to be true
(axioms) and some
are derived by applying truth preserving
operations to these axioms.

 
Usually the word "true" is not used when talking
about uninterpreted
formal systems. Axioms and what can be inferred
from axioms are called
"theorems". Theorems can be true in some
interpretations and false in
another. If the system is incosistent then there
is no interpretation
where all axioms are true.
 

 
I am not talking about how these things are usually
spoken of. I am
talking about my unique contribution to the actual
philosophical
foundation of {true on the basis of meaning}.

 
Which means you need to be VERY clear about what you
claim to be "usually spoken of" and what is your
unique contribution.
 
You then need to show how your contribution isn't in
conflict with the classical parts, but follows
within its definitions.
 
If you want to say that something in the classical
theory is not actually true, then you need to show
how removing that piece doesn't affect the system.
This seems to be a weak point of yours, you think
you can change a system, and not show that the
system can still exist as it was.
 

 
This is entirely comprised of relations between
finite strings:
some of which are stipulated to have the semantic
value of Boolean
true, and others derived from applying truth
preserving operations
to these finite string.
 
This is approximately equivalent to proofs from
axioms. It is not
exactly the same thing because an infinite sequence
of inference
steps may sometimes be required.. It is also not
exactly the same
because some proofs are not restricted to truth
preserving operations.
 

 
So, what effect does that difference have?
 
You seem here to accept that some truths are based
on an infinite sequence of operations, while you
admit that proofs are finite sequences, but it seems
you still assert that all truths must be provable.
 

 
I did not use the term "provable" or "proofs" these
only apply to
finite sequences. {derived from applying truth
preserving operations}
can involve infinite sequences.

 
But if true can come out of an infinite sequences, and
some need such an infinite sequence, but proof
requires a finite sequence, that shows that there will
exists some statements are true, but not provable.
 

 
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel
1931:43-44)
 
When we look at the way that {true on the basis of
meaning}
actually works, then all epistemological antinomies
are simply untrue.

 
And Godel would agree to that. You just don't
understand what that line 14 means.
 

 
It can be proven in a finite sequence of steps that
epistemological antinomies are simply untrue.
 
 
 

 
So?
 

 
So that directly contradicts what Gödel said in the quote
thus proving
that Gödel and Tarski were both fundamentally incorrect
in the basic
foundation of their work.
 

 
Where does he say wha tyo claim?
 
He says that it can be *USED* for a similar proof.
 

 
*IT CANNOT BE USED IN ANY UNDECIDABILITY PROOF HE IS CLUELESS*
*IT CANNOT BE USED IN ANY UNDECIDABILITY PROOF HE IS CLUELESS*
*IT CANNOT BE USED IN ANY UNDECIDABILITY PROOF HE IS CLUELESS*
*IT CANNOT BE USED IN ANY UNDECIDABILITY PROOF HE IS CLUELESS*
 
 

 
But he showed how it was used, so you are just proven wrong.
 

 
This proves that he did not understand undecidability, thus
making
the rest of his paper moot.

 
It shows no such thing.
 
Since, As I have pointed out, the actual statement, which you
don't seem to even be able to understand, is NOT an
epistemological antinomy, just shows that you don't understand
anything about the topic you are talking about.
 
You don't seem to understand even basic English, so you have
no place trying to talk about theories based on the "meaning
of words", as you have proved yourself incompetent.
 
 

 
Tarski anchors his entire proof in the above Gödel quote so
we can't just say one one little quote does not ruin the
whole thing.
 

 
Yep, and he is right.
 

 
The Liar Paradox is easily rejected by the correct foundation of
{true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that it cannot be
derived by applying truth preserving operations to finite strings
that are stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean true.

 
Yes, the liar paradox is a statement that can be neither true or
false.
 

 
Tarski thought that he proved that True(L, x) cannot be defined on
the basis that he could not prove that an expression that is
not true
is true.

 
Nope. You seem to have a mental block on this.
 
The point is that if "True(L, x)" is a predicate, then it ALWAYS
has a truth value, and that value is true if the statement is
true, and false if the statement is false, or not a truth bearer.
 

 
True(English, "a fish") is a type mismatch error, they must be
excluded and not merely construed as untrue.
 

 
No, since "a fish" is not a truth bearer, True(English, "a fish")
must return false.
 

 
Then it must also return false for ~X where X = "a fish"

 
Yes.
 

 

 

True(English, "this sentence is untrue")
is ALSO a type mismatch error, that must be
excluded and not merely construed as untrue.
 

 
Nope, since "this sentence is untrue" is not a true statement,
True(English, "this sentence is untrue") must return false.
 

 
Different yet equivalent protocol.

 
Nope.
 
True(L, f) must ALWAYS be a truth bearer, and thus ~True(L, f) must
also be one.
 

 

Remember, the truth predicate "True" doesn't return the truth
value of the expression, so doesn't have an answer for a
non-truth-bearer, but is a PREDICATE, that always returns a value,
which is TRUE if the expression is a true expression, and false
for everything else.
 
 

 
Boolean True(L,x) can return false when x is not a truth bearer
yet must also return false for ~x.

 
But the problem wasn't given ~x.
 
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) is BY DEFINITION a truth bearer,
as True must return a Truth Value for all inputs, and ~ a truth
valus is always the other truth value.
 

*You actually have to answer those questions and*
*not simply change the subject to another question*
 
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied to expressions
that are stipulated to be true derive p?

 
No, so True(L, p) is false
and thus ~True(L, p) is true.
 

 
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied to expressions
that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?

 
No, so False(L, p) is false,
 

I have spend literally thousands and thousands of hours on the
results of this simple little post over the last two decades.
 
*When p is neither True nor False then p is rejected as invalid*
*input and that is the complete end of any and all evaluation of p*
 

 
So, you just don't understand the definition of a Predicate.
 
Rejection is NOT a option.
 
The problem is you just don't understand the nature of the problem that
you have studied for those thousands and thousands of hours, which seems
to indicate a series lack of intelligence, or an intentional ignorance.

I think olcott lacks the connection with the real thing. He reads a lot but
do not understand their real meaning.