Sujet : Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems
De : polcott333 (at) *nospam* gmail.com (olcott)
Groupes : sci.logic comp.theoryDate : 14. Jun 2024, 15:58:47
Autres entêtes
Organisation : A noiseless patient Spider
Message-ID : <v4hian$2sdqr$6@dont-email.me>
References : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
User-Agent : Mozilla Thunderbird
On 6/14/2024 6:39 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 6/13/24 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
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It is how truth itself generically works.
If no physical or conceptual thing makes expression X true
then expression X is not true.
But truth needs a source, and the source can't just be the system.
The cat in your living room is the truthmaker for
"there is a cat in my living room}.
The definition of the ordered set of natural numbers
is the truthmaker for 5 > 3.
ALL systems need either some "first truths" that are unmade in the system, that all others derived from, or al; truths come from an infinite (possible circular) chain of reasoning.
No actual circles are ever involved.
(a) Expressions stipulated to be true: "cats are animals"
(b) Expressions derived by applying truth preserving operations to (a).
For a given system, those "first truths" might come from something outside, like the maker of the formal system, but when you try to make the system everything, you get stuck in the loop.
Never.
<snip>
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Only expressions of language that are true can have a truthmaker
and ALL expressions of language that are true must have some
physical or conceptual thing that makes them true or they are not true.
Nope, because "expressions of language" follow the same limitation. They don't have any meaning without the first establishment of "first words" whose definition can't be expressed from other previously defined words.
How may times do I have to tell you the exact same thing
until you can remember it from one message to the next?
(a) Expressions stipulated to be true: "cats are animals"
(b) Expressions derived by applying truth preserving operations to (a).
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as you eventually get to a root idea that doesn't have a truthmaker, not even a statement that makes it its own truth maker, as THAT statement needs a truth make.
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As I have told you hundreds of times the foundation of the truth
of all expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning}
is a connection to their meaning.
And it doesn't work, as the "first truths" can't have a "truthmaker".
The assignment of relations between arbitrary finite
strings assigns semantic meaning to these otherwise
meaningless finite strings.
The construction of Human language proves this:
cats are animals <translated to> 猫是动物
猫是动物 <translated to> cats are animals
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How do we know that kittens are living things and not fifteen
story office buildings? A stipulated set of connections between
finite strings tells us so.
Right, and if you pull the thread, you will ultimately reach the first truths of the system which have no truthmaker in the system.
The assignment of relations between arbitrary finite
strings assigns semantic meaning to these otherwise
meaningless finite strings.
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If of everything there is nothing that makes expression of language X
true then X is untrue.
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X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
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If neither X nor ~X has a truthmaker then X is not a truth-bearer.
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So, what makes the truthmakers truthmakers, you need a more fundamental truth maker, which take you to infinite depth.
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The problem with all of the research in the field is that it is
either too specific, too vague or ambiguous. When I expand the
scope to every physical thing and every conceptual thing then
if no thing makes an expression true it is determined to be untrue.
No, you don't understand the reasearch.
You can only be a naysayer that makes assertions
entirely bereft of any supporting reasoning.
This is your problem, if you don't understand it, you assume it to be wrong, instead of just over your head.
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At least half of the experts in the field that seem to comprise
the received view is that there are some truths that no thing
makes them true and they are somehow true anyway.
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Because, that is a necessity, at least in one way of looking at it.
To have your stipulated axiom set, you need something with the power to stipulate them, and that ability can't come from the system.
That is not the actual case
M: This sentence has no truthmaker
Milne argues that M is true and therefore is a truth without a truthmaker.
No one is arguing that "cats are animals" has no truthmaker.
-- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Geniushits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer