Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases with mt new notion of {linguistic truth}

On 9/7/24 9:44 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/7/2024 7:22 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/6/24 11:31 PM, olcott wrote:

On 9/6/2024 6:10 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/6/24 8:10 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/6/2024 6:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/5/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:

On 9/5/2024 9:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/5/24 8:58 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
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*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
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knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

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The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
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Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.

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The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
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Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.

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Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
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The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
Millions of these stipulated relations in a knowledge hierarchy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
comprise human knowledge expressed in language.
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Stipulated relations are like the Prolog Facts. Truth preserving
operations are like the Prolog Rules. Anything unprovable by
Facts and Rules in the system is untrue in the system.
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Self-contradictory expressions are rejected as not truth bearers
instead of categorized as undecidable propositions.

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Which just shows you don't even understand the problem that Gettier was pointing out. It isn't "bad logic", it is knowing you have a correct interpretation of your observations.
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Your problem is it is impossible to determine "sufficient verification".
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It was a justified true belief (all three were stipulated)
except the justification had a loophole allowing it to be
insufficient justification under Gettier.

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And the problem is you can't just "define away" that insufficiency.
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Your problem is you just don't know enough to see the problem, and thus assume there isn't one, which is EXACTLY the sort of thing Gettier was pointing out. One of the examples was deducing there was a fire because they saw smoke, but the "smoke" was just a cloud of insects, and not smoke, attracted to the fire that wasn't creating smoke.
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The justification was incorrect, so should we call that knowledge of fire, and if someone can be convinced they "know" something, when they don't, were they correct in calling it "knowledge", and if we can't actually know that we know something, do we even know it, even if it might be true?
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Just like it is stipulated to be true, it is now stipulated
to be "sufficient justification". The strongest justification
is a necessary consequence from stipulated truths.

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No, you are just showing your ignorance for the words or what the problem is.
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It is not "stipulated" that knowledge is true, it is a definitional requirement. And the problem that Gettier was talking about is that we can't be certain our interpretation of our observation is correct, so we can't be sure our reaso
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*The simplest example of this is the syllogism*
Major premise: All humans are mortal.
Minor premise: All Greeks are humans.
Conclusion/Consequent: All Greeks are mortal.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Basic_structure

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Which, since it has no "observations" in it, doesn't talk about the issue here.
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It provides a concrete example of sufficient justification thus
conclusively proving the sufficient justification exists.

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Nope, just that you don't understand the logic you are talking about.
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Gettier isn't talking about "Analytic Truth" which is a truth based on the defined definitions, but on Knowledge based on observation, i.e emperical knowledge.
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Other justifications would be less certain
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
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Which seems to mean that you are just trying to define away the problem by ignoring it.

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A justified true belief is impossibly false because it is stipulated
to only apply to true beliefs.

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And that is the problem, you can't TELL if it is a justified true belief, so you can't tell if it is actually knowledge.
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Gettier is talking about knowledge that comes from observations, and the fact that it seems impossible to determine if we are "correctly interpreting" or observations of the world.
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Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem#Case_I
Sufficient evidence that Smith got the job would be the boss
tells Smith he got the job.

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Nope, The boss might have lied.
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It is 100% impossible that the boss lied because in all
of these cases the belief is stipulated to be true.

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Nope, you don't understand that problem.
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The question is how can you determine that your believe has sufficent reason to be true.

 Within the stipulated definitions that I am
providing that is the same as asking how do
you know that a true statement is true?

Right, How do you *KNOW* that the statement you THINK is true, is actually true.
Remember, you only know the given stipulations of the system, not the unstated stipulations of the meta-system or the model you are working in.

 We could define knowledge differently
as any believe such that we have sufficient
reason to know it is true.
 Example your boss tells you you got the job and you
take the job and work on the job for ten years.
This is 100% perfectly sufficient reason to know
you got the job.
 

And then retire and apply for Social Securith and find that he never told the government you worked for him, and thus find out that legally, you never actually worked for him.
Yes, SOME statements can have strong enough evidence that we can be very certain they must be true. But that isn't the problem. The problem that he was looking at is that on the edge, we can not define a point where we can demark the line between the concept that we actually KNOW something and we don't but think we do.
Here is where your use of the fallacy of proof by example shows how stupid you are.