Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases with mt new notion of {linguistic truth}

On 9/12/24 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/11/2024 6:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/11/24 8:00 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/10/2024 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/10/24 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
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*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
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knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

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The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
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Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.

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The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
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Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.

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Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
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The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.

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I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
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This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
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I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
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Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.

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Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term.
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I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM

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Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
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A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition

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A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino
is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the
opus or discussion where it is presented.
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*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott

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With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
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No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).

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In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot
be rejected.
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If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.

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No, you are too stupid to understand that "rejection" isn't an option,

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In other words you are trying to pretend that type mismatch
error doesn't exist. What is the square root of an actual dead frog?
The answer must be numeric and it must be correct.
"rejection" isn't an option
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No, just that it can't be a "type mismatch",

 That is is ridiculously stupid thing to say
you are claiming that an actual dead frog has a numeric square root

Nope, I am claiming that a statement that was derived from the system can't be a type mismatch in the system.

 *This has been my original basis since 2012*
 Kurt Gödel in his 1944 Russell's mathematical logic gave the following definition of the "theory of simple types" in a footnote:
 By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the objects of thought ... are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types fitting together.

So, where does the statement "x" violate that?
Remember, Tarski shows that "x" is a statement derivable in the system when we include the fact that a Truth Predicate True(L, x) exists.

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
 

as just prior to that Tarski proved that the statement *WAS* a valid statement.
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You are just proving you don't undertstand what you are reading and just guessing (incorrectly) what things means, which is one of the methods of stupidity. Smart people when they come across something they don't understand, spend so time to learn the meaning, but you are afraid that the truth will brainwash you, because you have already brainwashed yourself.