Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases with mt new notion of {linguistic truth}

On 9/12/24 8:10 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/12/2024 3:17 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-11 11:44:39 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/11/2024 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-10 13:46:59 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
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On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
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*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
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knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

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The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
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Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.

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The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
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Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.

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Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
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The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.

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I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
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This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
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I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
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Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.

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Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term.
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I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM

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Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
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A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition

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A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino
is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the
opus or discussion where it is presented.
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*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott

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With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
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No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).

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In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot
be rejected.
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If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
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https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
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LP := ~True(LP)
(0) not  (1)
(1) true (0) // cycle in digraph

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For ordinary first order logic it is possible to make a program that
reads a text file and checks whether it is a vlaid proof. Is the same
possible for your Minimal Type Theory?

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I don't need any of that.

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If your Minimal Type Theory does not do more than that then it is not
publishable in a respectable journal.
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 In other words if MTT has unlimited orders of logic
this makes MTT inferior to FOL?

It becomes inferior because you idea might take a finite logic system, and blow it up into an uncounably infinite logic system as you need to make EVERYTHING, all functions and such, into base objects.
Basically, you try to fold everything into first order logic by making your "set of concepts" into a truely universal set, which just make you subcomb to the Russel Paradox.

 The prior version of MTT simply translated its expressions
into directed graph of the evaluation sequence. A cycle
in this evaluation sequence proved that the expression
was ill-formed.

Which just shows that you system is too limited as SOME cyclic expressions are evaluatable.

 https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
 LP := ~True(LP)
00 ~    (01)
01 True (00)
 

All that I need to do
is reject the Liar Paradox as invalid input because
it specifies a cycle in its evaluation sequence.
Tarski was simply far too stupid to this this.

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Then you needn't tell anybody about your rejection.
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