Re: The Foundation of Linguistic truth is stipulated relations between finite strings

On 9/13/24 10:38 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/13/2024 6:52 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-04 03:41:58 +0000, olcott said:
>

The Foundation of Linguistic truth is stipulated relations
between finite strings.
>
The only way that we know that "cats" <are> "animals"
(in English) is the this is stipulated to be true.
>
*This is related to*
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of
natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning
of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their
truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally
associated with Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out
for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic
theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
>
*Yet equally applies to formal languages*

>
No, it does not. Formal languages are designed for many different
purposes. Whether they have any semantics and the nature of the
semantics of those that have is determined by the purpose of the
language.
>

 Formal languages are essentially nothing more than
relations between finite strings.
 Thus, given T, an elementary theorem is an elementary
statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
 Some of these relations between finite strings are
elementary theorems thus are stipulated to be true.
 Thus True(L,x) merely means there is a sequence of truth
preserving operations from x in L to elementary theorems
of L.
 

Right, but the claim that such a predicate exist proves that it can't do its job correctly, is Tarski showed that, at least for a sufficiently powerful system, that we CAN construct in its language, using just the axioms of the system, and the assumption that True(L, x) is an existing Truth Predicate, the statement: "X (in L) is defined to be ~True(L,x)" and then that such an X cause True to be unable to meet its requirements.