Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context.

On 21/03/2025 23:48, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/21/25 4:20 PM, Richard Heathfield wrote:

On 21/03/2025 19:30, Keith Thompson wrote:

My understanding is that Gödel proved that there are statements
that are true but not provable.

>
Yes. Incompleteness.
>

It's still not possible for both
X and not-X to be provable.  If proofs exist for both, at least
one of the proofs must be flawed.

>
I'd be interested to see a proof of that conjecture.
>

 It comes from the definition of consistency.

<sigh> So much for my sense of humour, which is showing distinct signs of rust.

 If something is provable, then it must be true, as the proof shows the path from the fundamental truths the the stateemnt, establishing its truth.

I am tempted to argue that we may instead deduce that one of the fundamental truths isn't as true as it's supposed to be. But... peace! I will not argue that, because it's the stuff that crankitude is made of, and while crankinosity may be something I'd enjoy flirting with, I simply don't have the time.
--
Richard Heathfield
Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
"Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
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