Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context.

On 2025-03-22 02:31:23 +0000, Richard Damon said:

On 3/21/25 9:57 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/21/2025 7:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/21/25 6:54 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/21/2025 6:48 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/20/25 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/20/2025 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/20/25 6:14 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/19/2025 8:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/19/25 5:50 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/18/2025 10:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/18/25 9:36 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:

Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:

 We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!

That does not disprove Tarski.
 

 He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
 

  But if x is what you are saying is

 A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.

 Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false, but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false, becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a contradiction in the system.
 That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows how stupid you are.
 

 True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.

 Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length.
 

 This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.

 But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity.
 Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta- systems, Tarski proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about, which creates the problem statement.
 

 It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
 

 Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references.
 And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the language will be true if and only if ! True(x), which he showed can be done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system must have.
 Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are talking about.

 We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.

 A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic
with equivalence and the following additional symbols:

 I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.
 The language must be expressive enough to fully
encode any and all details of each element of the
entire body of human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language. Davidson semantics
provides another encoding.
 

 But "encoding" knowledge, isn't a logic system.

Unless you bother to pay attention to the details
of how this of encoded.

 But "Encoded Knowledge" isn't a logic system. PERIOD. BYU DEFINITION. That would just be a set of axioms. Note, Logic system must also have a set of rules of relationships and how to manipulate them,

 Yes stupid I already specified those 150 times.
TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS.
 

and that needs more that just expressing them as knowledge.
 

 NOT AT ALL DUMB BUNNY, for all the expressions
that are proved completely true entirely on the basis of
their meaning expressed in language they only need a
connection this semantic meaning to prove that they
are true.
 

 

 Part of the problem is that most of what we call "Human Knowledge" isn't logically defined truth, but is just "Emperical Knowledge", for which we

 The set of human knowledge that can be expressed
in language provides the means to compute True(X).

 Of course not, as then True(x) just can't handle a statement whose truth is currently unknown, which it MUST be able to handle
 

 It employs the same algorithm as Prolog:
Can X be proven on the basis of Facts?

 And thus you just admitted that your system doesn't even QUALIFY to be the system that Tarski is talking about.
 You don't seem to understand that fact, because apparently you can't actually understand any logic system more coplicated than what Prolog can handle.
 

 This concise specification is air-tight.
The set of all human general knowledge that can be expressed
using language has no undecidability or undefinability.
 

 Nope. Proven otherwise, and you are just showing your stupidity in maintaining that claim.
 

 Then try and show ALL OF THE DETAILS OF how when one starts
with basic facts and only applies truth preserving operations that
True(X) is not always correct.

 You have already shown that you don't understand the proof, so why should I repeat it,
 Look at Tarski's FULL paper (and the material he references) and see how he develops the expression of x in the language, by working in the metalanguage it embed the needed meaning into x
 

 I have already specified a system that needs no
metalanguage because it has all of its full
semantics specified syntactically and I  got
the essence of this idea from Gödel back in 2012
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
 

 So, how do you assign the values to all the axioms via axioms?
 You can't do it in the system, as it adds axioms that also need to be numbered.
 Please show how you can make a system with two "normal" axioms, plus the axioms to assign numbers to every axiom in the system.
 Remember, you need a finite number of axioms in the final system.

For Gödel's and Tarski's proofs the set of the axioms need not be
finite. If is sufficient that there is a method to determine whether
a sentence is an axiom.
--
Mikko