Re: True on the basis of meaning --- Good job Richard ! ---Socratic method

On 5/17/2024 8:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/17/24 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/17/2024 8:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

>
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
>
You already admitted that True(L,p) and False(L,p) both return false.
This is the correct value that these predicates correctly derived.

>
Right, but that also means that we can show that True(L, true) returns false, which says your logic system is broken by being inconsistant.
>

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Not at all. Your version of the Truth Teller paradox has
the conventional lack of a truth object as the Liar Paradox
and the Truth Teller paradox: What are they true about?

 In other words, you logic doesn't have an absolute idea of truth!!!
 

It does have an immutably correct notion of {true on the basis
of meaning} and rejects finite strings as not truth bearers on
this basis.

The object that made the statement true, was that True(L, p) said that p wasn't true.
 

*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*

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This sentence is true.
What is it true about?
It is true about being true.
What is it is true about being true about?
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This turns out to be Kripke ungrounded yet Kripke did
not know the algorithmic basis for Kripke grounding.
>
*Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke* (1975)
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
>
>

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It seems that now you are now disagreeing with your own self. You are
saying the predicates are broken BECAUSE THEY RETURN THE CORRECT VALUE.
>

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No, your logic system disagrees with itself, I am just pointing that out.
>

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All that you pointed out is that you still don't understand
the Truth Teller paradox.

 No, YOU don't understand that True MUST be a truth beared, or you are just a liar that your system has a Truth Predicate.
  Remember, we started with
 p in L is ~True(L, p)
you say True(L, p) is false

*No you said this* (Socratic question)

thus the truth value of p MUST be true, since it is not the falseness of True(L, p)
 

We test p for True or False if neither it is tossed out on its ass.
It is like we are testing if a person is hungry:
We ask is the person dead? The answer is yes and then you
say what if they are still hungry?

Thus we can say that p is also the equivalent in L of
 

We sure as Hell cannot correctly say that.
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*

~True(L, ~True(L, p))

~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is not true")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is true")) is true

 Which since we showed that True(L, p) was false, that means that the outer True predicate sees a true statement (since it is the negation of a false statement)

~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true

 and thus True(L, ~True(L, p)) is true, and thus we can show that p must be false.
 

By this same reasoning we can show that "a fish" must be false.

Thus we have a contradiction.
 So, if you want to claim "Truth Teller Paradox", the only answer is to say that True(L, p) isn't actually a truth-bearer,

*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*

and thus it isn't a predicate, and you have lied that your system has one.
 

>

This is the problem with the assumption that a Truth Predicate exists, and is what Tarksi was pointing out, but which seems to be above your level of understanding.

 

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer