Sujet : Re: Problem with FEATURE('sts'): bogus "not listed in SANs" rejects
De : bjorn (at) *nospam* mork.no (Bjørn Mork)
Groupes : comp.mail.sendmailDate : 11. Nov 2024, 17:09:13
Autres entêtes
Organisation : m
Message-ID : <87wmh9u506.fsf@miraculix.mork.no>
References : 1 2 3 4 5
User-Agent : Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/28.2 (gnu/linux)
Claus Aßmann
<INVALID_NO_CC_REMOVE_IF_YOU_DO_NOT_POST_ml+sendmail(-no-copies-please)@esmtp.org>
writes:
There is only one other fix in the current code, hence we haven't
released a new version (yet).
If you're looking for another quick fix to justify a new version, then
may I suggest making _FFR_TLS_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE default?
The Debian sendmail package is still built without this (I will open a
bug now). Googling a bit I see that Redhat hit the problem a few years
ago:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1565341There are probably many other distros, or end users building their own
binary, doing the same because they are unaware of the setting.
A binary built without that flag can only use server certificates
directly signed by a CA known to the client. A well known workaround is
to add intermediate CAs to the CACertFile. The simplest method is by
using the server certificate chain for both ServerCertFile and
CACertFile.
A side effect of this workaround is that intermediate CAs are also
trusted to sign client certificates. Which will cause policy conflicts.
If the server certificate is signed by a public CA using an intermediate
CA, which I will claim is an extremely common use case nowadays, then
client certificates are useless unless _FFR_TLS_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE
is set.
Yes, I know I still can configure client trust by DN using the access
db. But AUTH EXTERNAL is not possible in a secure way AFAICS.
Even worse, users may be tempted to ignore the security implications and
trust client certificates even if they depend onq the CACertFile workaround.
Bjørn