Sujet : Re: [LINK] Calling time on DNSSEC?
De : invalid (at) *nospam* invalid.invalid (Richard Kettlewell)
Groupes : comp.miscDate : 05. Dec 2024, 09:46:37
Autres entêtes
Organisation : terraraq NNTP server
Message-ID : <wwvfrn2y0sy.fsf@LkoBDZeT.terraraq.uk>
References : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
User-Agent : Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/28.2 (gnu/linux)
Grant Taylor <
gtaylor@tnetconsulting.net> writes:
On 12/3/24 23:49, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
It can’t be.
>
Sure it can.
>
TLS cannot start encryption on HTTP until it gets a cert that
identifies the server.
>
The TLS connection is fully established and fully encrypted *BEFORE*
any HTTP is sent /through/ /the/ /inside/ /of/ /said/ /TLS/
connection.
ESNI and ECH seem to work by publishing a separate provider key. There
might be good reasons for that design in the context of TLS though it’s
not how I’d have done it, given a clean sheet.
In the abstract the purpose of a certificate in TLS-like protocols is to
provide the key used to sign the key exchange process. With (EC)DH or
ML-KEM there’s no inherent reason that has to be delivered in the
unencrypted part of the protocol; it might add another round trip to
session setup but so would gathering completely separate keys as in
ESNI/ECH, if I’ve understood them correctly.
With RSA key exchange that wouldn’t be true, but that’s out of favor for
TLS these days anyway.
-- https://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/