Re: Analytic Truth-makers

On 7/22/24 12:42 PM, olcott wrote:

I have focused on analytic truth-makers where an expression of language x is shown to be true in language L by a sequence of truth preserving operations from the semantic meaning of x in L to x in L.
 In rare cases such as the Goldbach conjecture this may require an infinite sequence of truth preserving operations thus making analytic knowledge a subset of analytic truth. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture
 There are cases where there is no finite or infinite sequence of
truth preserving operations to x or ~x in L because x is self-
contradictory in L. In this case x is not a truth-bearer in L.
  

So, now you ADMIT that Formal Logical systems can be "incomplete" because there exist analytic truths in them that can not be proven with an actual formal proof (which, by definition, must be finite).
I guess you will stop saying that Godel must be wrong.
Godel's statement G, that says that there is no natural number g that satifies a specific Primative Recursive Relationship that was developed in a Meta-Theory of the F that the statement G is put in.
This statement is shown to be true by a proof in that meta-theory, and shown to be true by an infinite set of steps in the Theory F, and it is shown that there can not be a finite proof in F to prove the statement G.
I guess now you admit that is all correct, and all your rebuttals about it not possible being true were just your own mistakes that became lies by the reckless disregard for the actual truth that you now see and apparently renounce your old arguements.
Note, your claim of them being "rare" cases is likely not really true. The problem is that unless we find a meta-theory to support a proof of the statement, we can't tell if the statement IS true, so who knows how many of the unsolved problems are actually unsolvable in their system.