Re: True on the basis of meaning --- Good job Richard ! ---Socratic method MTT

On 5/28/24 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/28/2024 1:59 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-05-27 14:34:14 +0000, olcott said:
>

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
>
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
>
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the
evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem
to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is
only evaluating the structure of the expression.

>
The words "not" and "true" of Prolog are meaningful in some contexts
but not above. The word "true" is meaningful only when it has no arguments.
>

 That Prolog construes any expression having the same structure as the
Liar Paradox as having a cycle in the directed graph of its evaluation
sequence already completely proves my point. In other words Prolog
is saying that there is something wrong with the expression and it must
be rejected.

But Prolog doesn't support powerful enough logic to handle the system like Tarski and Godel are talking about.
The fact that Prolog just rejects it shows that.

 

You could try
?- LP = not(true(LP), true(LP).
>
or
?- LP = not(true(LP), not(true(LP)).
>
The predicate unify_with_occurs_check checks whether the resulting
sructure is acyclic because that is its purpose. Whether a simple

 Yes exactly. If I knew that Prolog did this then I would not have
created Minimal Type Theory that does this same thing. That I did
create MTT that does do this same thing makes my understanding much
deeper.
 

unification like LP = not(true(LP)) does same is implementation
dependent as Prolog rules permit but do not require that. In a
typical implementation a simple unification does not check for
cycles.
>

 ISO Prolog implementations have the built-in predicate
unify_with_occurs_check/2 for sound unification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occurs_check#Sound_unification
 Alternatively such expressions crash or remain stuck in infinite loops.
 

Anyway, none of this is relevant to the topic of this thread or
topics of sci.logic.
>

     ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
    a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:40)
 Gödel, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
 https://monoskop.org/images/9/93/Kurt_G%C3%B6del_On_Formally_Undecidable_Propositions_of_Principia_Mathematica_and_Related_Systems_1992.pdf
     It would
    then be possible to reconstruct the *antinomy of the liar* in the
    metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence x
    such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
    with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
 CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN FORMALIZED LANGUAGES, Tarski
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
 The Liar Paradox and other such {epistemological antinomies} must be
rejected as type mismatch errors for any system of bivalent logic thus
cannot be correctly used for any undecidability or undefinability proof.
 

But you just don't don't understand what was done in those proofs.
Neither of them assumed the Liar's paradox had a truth value. Only statements formed from VALID logical sequences in the field.
Please try to show what step in Godel's or Tarski's proof where they made a logical error (not just came up with a statement you think can't be valid).
You can't, as shown by the fact that you never have even come close to that, and that would be the actual nail in the coffin for the proofs.
All you are showing is that trying to add your rules to conventional logic makes the system inconsistant, or requires removing some major capability of the logic. Most people will prefer to live with the limitations that some true statements can not be proven, which is sort of what the lack of a Truth Predicate also says.
it seems you just want a world where no one can use logic too complicated for you to understand, (which isn't very much logic).
It ain't going to happen.