Re: H(D,D) cannot even be asked about the behavior of D(D) --- Truth Itself is not Broken.

On 6/15/24 11:41 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/15/2024 10:18 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 6/15/24 11:03 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/15/2024 9:46 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 6/15/24 10:23 AM, olcott wrote:

>
No you are wrong about this. The first thing that I discovered
about this at least twenty years ago is that it is always an
acyclic graph.

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Which means there is always a set of root nodes that do not have a truth-maker coming into them.
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When we do this that way that the Cyc project does it {thing} is
the ultimate root node. {thing} is divided up into types of things.
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By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
objects of thought ... are divided into types, namely: individuals,
properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of
such relations, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>

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When you try to come up with a concrete counter-example I will
point out your specific mistake.

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But I have conceptually.
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Show me a root concept, that has a truth-maker but doesn't depend on anything else. If you use words to describe it, how do those words have meaning without being defined by other words.
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{thing} is the root of the whole knowledge tree.

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And what DEFINES {thing}?
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 Its constituents.

In other words, the definition is circular.

 

and what distingueshes the things derived from {thing}
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Their placement in the inheritance hierarchy.

So, what distinguishes the first thing derived from thing from the second? Only what derives from them, in that case, again, your definitions are circular.

 

All these need definitions (what are part of truth=making) from OUTSIDE the system.
>

 The accurate verbal model of the actual world encoded in
something like simple type theory.

In other words, you are just ADMITTING, that everything in the model gets its "meaning" from EMPRICAL TRUTH as looking at the actual world, and derives from meaning from the "poorly defined" natural languages of that world.
So, NOTHING in that system has truth-makers in the system, and NOTHING is actually "analytically true" as everything fundamentally devolse to an empirical truth.

 

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There is a fundamental problem of first principles that need to stand on their own without support from anything in the system.
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The definition of the meaning of a term is the truthmaker
for this term. The terms that this definition is composed
of have their own definitions. This is recursively quite
deep yet zero actual cycles.

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And what makes that definition true?
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What makes puppies not a type of fifteen story office building?

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Because we have defined the terms that way.
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Yes, you are starting to get this.
Fifteen story office buildings never wag their tail.

But there is not fundamental truth-maker to establish any of this.

 

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The correct verbal model of the actual world encodes relations
between types of things as stipulated relations between finite
strings.

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And stipulations don't have truth makers in the system.
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The verified fact that puppies really do wag their tails
is the truthmaker for {puppies wag their tails}.

In other words, your whole system is just based on emperical truth, and analytical truth doesn't actually exist.

 

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That we have many human languages that encode the same relations
between types of things in the world and each one does it using
different finite strings proves the stipulated aspect of this.

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And Human Languages have circular definitions for words,

 No you are wrong.
Provide a counter-example.
it is always a type hierarchy.

Show me a word that isn't defined from other words, in other words, show me a root.
A tree with a root must either be infinite in depth or have cycles.

 

thus you can not trace them to a "root". We need to start with a set of first concepts that we agree OUTSIDE OF LANGUAGE what they mean, and express these definitions as loops within the language.
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By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the objects of thought ... are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
 This can be further simplified to types of relations between
finite strings.

And ultimately needs to rely on things not established by Truth-Makers in the system.

 

These words have no "truth-makers"
>

Incorrect.

So, what are they?

 

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How can you write a "defintion" for the first term of your system?
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It is the same sort of knowledge tree that the Cyc project uses
to encode an accurate verbal model of the actual world.

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and, as I asked, how do they actually DEFINE {thing} or diferentiate between the sub-concepts off of {thing}
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{Thing} is the root and is defined by itself constituents types of things.

So, it is either defined based on the ENGLISH sentence, and thus we pull enough of English into the system to define it, and get into the cycles of English, or
it is defined in terms of things that definie themselves on {Thing} and thus is circularly defined.

 

Only by using information from OUTSIDE the system.
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Not at all.

Then you have cycles.

 

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You ALWAYS need to reference something outside your system, and when you then include that source, you need to find the root of THAT system, and your problem continues.
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Not really, even the root of the knowledge tree {thing}
is defined in terms of its constituents.
>
>

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So, if those constituents are in the system, we have a circular definition, and if outside, it isn't a self-sufficient system.

 A type hierarchy definitely does not have any cycles.
Most all of human knowledge that can be expressed using
language can be fully encoded as relations between finite
strings in a type hierarchy.

And doesn't have definitions in the system of its roots.

 Some knowledge requires specifying a sequence of procedural
steps. This requires sequence, selection and iteration.

And thus need definitions from outside the system, or cycles.

 The Cyc project uses GUIDs in place of finite strings.
This makes their system generic to all human knowledge.
I am sorry to say that Doug Lenat died last year.
 

But the definitions still need to either rely on cycles or things outside the system, or just remain undefined.