Re: H(D,D) cannot even be asked about the behavior of D(D) --- Truth Itself is not Broken.

On 6/15/24 12:11 PM, olcott wrote:

On 6/15/2024 10:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 6/15/24 11:41 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/15/2024 10:18 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 6/15/24 11:03 AM, olcott wrote:

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{thing} is the root of the whole knowledge tree.

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And what DEFINES {thing}?
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Its constituents.

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In other words, the definition is circular.
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 If you can't understand that a type hierarchy is not circular
then your knowledge is woefully inadequate to continue this
discussion.

But the type hierarchy is not the definitions of the type hierarchy.
You can not DEFINE the hierarchy without reference to either circular defintions or terms outside your system.

 

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and what distingueshes the things derived from {thing}
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Their placement in the inheritance hierarchy.

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So, what distinguishes the first thing derived from thing from the second? Only what derives from them, in that case, again, your definitions are circular.
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 If you can't understand that a type hierarchy is not circular
then your knowledge is woefully inadequate to continue this
discussion.

And without definitions for the "types", it is just a meaningless tree of undefined terms. But then, that somehow seems normal for you systems, you throw out terms you don't understand and see what sticks to the wall, which results in a zero-knowledge/truth system.

 

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All these need definitions (what are part of truth=making) from OUTSIDE the system.
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The accurate verbal model of the actual world encoded in
something like simple type theory.

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In other words, you are just ADMITTING, that everything in the model gets its "meaning" from EMPRICAL TRUTH as looking at the actual world, and derives from meaning from the "poorly defined" natural languages of that world.
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 Not at all.

Sure seems like it.

 

So, NOTHING in that system has truth-makers in the system, and NOTHING is actually "analytically true" as everything fundamentally devolse to an empirical truth.
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 An accurate verbal model of the actual world does specify
all of the knowledge that can be expressed using language.

And the word definitions of natural language are circular.

 

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There is a fundamental problem of first principles that need to stand on their own without support from anything in the system.
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The definition of the meaning of a term is the truthmaker
for this term. The terms that this definition is composed
of have their own definitions. This is recursively quite
deep yet zero actual cycles.

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And what makes that definition true?
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What makes puppies not a type of fifteen story office building?

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Because we have defined the terms that way.
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Yes, you are starting to get this.
Fifteen story office buildings never wag their tail.

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But there is not fundamental truth-maker to establish any of this.
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 It is all semantic interconnections specified as something like
a type hierarchy.

Excpet that definitions become circular or reference out of system definitions.

 

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The correct verbal model of the actual world encodes relations
between types of things as stipulated relations between finite
strings.

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And stipulations don't have truth makers in the system.
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The verified fact that puppies really do wag their tails
is the truthmaker for {puppies wag their tails}.

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In other words, your whole system is just based on emperical truth, and analytical truth doesn't actually exist.
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 Right there really is no such thing as words thus you
never really said that.

But you seem to be using the Natural Language meaning of the words, which are just "Emperical" as they are based on truths that are observed and not analytically defined. The "Natural" part of Natural Language means that it is as found in "Nature", i.e. the real world. Ultimately, the Natural Language meaning of the word "Cat" relies on the observation and sense data of how that word is used in reality. We might then formalize it some, but the core meanings of Natural Language are learned experimentally, not logically.

 

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That we have many human languages that encode the same relations
between types of things in the world and each one does it using
different finite strings proves the stipulated aspect of this.

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And Human Languages have circular definitions for words,

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No you are wrong.
Provide a counter-example.
it is always a type hierarchy.

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Show me a word that isn't defined from other words, in other words, show me a root.
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A tree with a root must either be infinite in depth or have cycles.
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 No and you cannot show otherwise.
Willard Van Orman Quine got totally confused by this and got
most everyone else to follow his inept reasoning.

Try to show one that doesn't

 He had no idea how the definition of bachelor(x) and ~Married(x)
could be defined in a non-circular way.
 (a) first define human
(b) next defined married
(c) next define bachelor as ~married.

Except that ISN'T the definition of "bachelor", as he points out, it has many meanings. So, your argument is based on a LIE.

 

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thus you can not trace them to a "root". We need to start with a set of first concepts that we agree OUTSIDE OF LANGUAGE what they mean, and express these definitions as loops within the language.
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By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the objects of thought ... are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
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This can be further simplified to types of relations between
finite strings.

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And ultimately needs to rely on things not established by Truth-Makers in the system.
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 The definitions of terms specified as relations between other terms
are the truthmakers for these terms.

And those definitions need truth-makers, as language is circular or out-side refering.

 

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These words have no "truth-makers"
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Incorrect.

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So, what are they?
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 Semantic gibberish just like "this sentence is not true".

In other words, you are ADMITTING that the word you use don't actually have meaning, so there is not truth-makers for them.

 

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How can you write a "defintion" for the first term of your system?
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It is the same sort of knowledge tree that the Cyc project uses
to encode an accurate verbal model of the actual world.

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and, as I asked, how do they actually DEFINE {thing} or diferentiate between the sub-concepts off of {thing}
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{Thing} is the root and is defined by itself constituents types of things.

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So, it is either defined based on the ENGLISH sentence, and thus we pull enough of English into the system to define it, and get into the cycles of English, or
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THERE ARE NO CYCLES IN A TYPE HIERARCHY.
 

But there is in the definition of the terms.
Without defintions, the hierarchy is just gibberish.