Re: True on the basis of meaning --- Good job Richard ! ---Socratic method

On 5/19/24 9:41 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

No, your system contradicts itself.
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You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox.

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No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
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My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from

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And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of false, has asserted that such a sequence exists.
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On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
 >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 >>>
 >>> Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
 >>
 >> Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
 >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
 > No, so True(L, p) is false
 >>
 >> Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
 >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
 >
 > No, so False(L, p) is false,
 >
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*To help you concentrate I repeated this*
The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*

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And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
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YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN
THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE
TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
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The first thing that the formal system does with any
arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))

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No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
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The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
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Not allowed.
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My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
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A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
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*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
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So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
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Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
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So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your definition will say that True(L, p) will return false?
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It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
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Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
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 True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.

So, x being DEFINED to be a certain sentence doesn't make x to have the same meaning as the sentence itself?
What does it mean to define a name to a given sentence, if not that such a name referes to exactly that sentence?

 ~True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as ~True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.

Again, what does "Defined as" mean to you?

 Compared to most of the rest of the world including leading
experts in this field you are doing quite well with this.
 One of the top experts in the field of truthmaker maximalism
is not even sure that "This sentence is not true" is not
a truth bearer. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Max
This means that you are ahead of the leading experts in the field.
 

Maybe your problem is you just forgot to learn the meaning of the key words in the things you want to talk about.
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That means that the predicate establishes that there IS a seriers of truth perservion operations that derive the expreson ~True(L, p).
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You keep confusing:
This sentence is not true.
with
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true".
I have spent 20,000 hours on this YOU WILL NOT FIND ANY ACTUAL MISTAKE.

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I have been using NEITHER of those sentences, only YOU have in your confusion.
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You have been saying things with isomorphic structure.
LP := ~True(L,LP)
  True(L,LP) is false
True(L,~LP) is false
~True(True(L,LP)) is true
 *This last one does not make LP true*
*This last one has one level of indirect reference*

I don't think you actually understand what a reference is.
LP := LP is false.
is the liar's paradox, with LP being a reference to that statement "LP is false"
or less formally: "This sentence is not true", which uses a pronoun to avoid creating a name for the sentence.

 

If your problem is that you can not think of Formal statements as Formal statement, but need to translate them into sloppy English, that is YOUR problem, and means you need to just admit you don't know what you are talking about.
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And if so, doesnt that mean that the truth value of p will be true, since p is defined as the logical negation of True(L, p), which we just establish HAS a sequence of truth perservion operations as indicated by the truth predicate.
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In Prolog both the Liar Paradox and the Truth Teller Paradox
get stuck in an infinite loop (technically a cycle in the directed
graph of their evaluation sequence).

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I don't CARE are PROLOG, as it doesn't actually define what we are talking about.
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P
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https://www.swi-prolog.org/pldoc/man?predicate=unify_with_occurs_check/2
Catches this cycle and reject it.

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So, that just means that Prolog (or you) can not handle the logic system, as one of the requirements for the proof was that the logic was capable of expressing sentences with references to sentences, even its self.
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 *Maybe you do not understand that a cycle in a directed graph is*
If you do not understand this then you can't understand that
when an expression has a cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence that this expression cannot be evaluated.

I fully understand the meaning, and it is just false in some cases.
for instance, x = x*x - 2 can be evaluated, and we find that x can be -1 or 2.

 It is the same basic idea as an unconditional infinite loop
in a program. The evaluation and the program cannot terminate.

But not all loops are unconditionally infinite.

 

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This sentence is not true.
What is it not true about?
It is not true about being not true.
What is it not true about being not true about?
It is not true about being not true about being not true...

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RED HERRING
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 Not at all. I have expressly shown the cycle in the directed
graph of the evaluation sequence of "This sentence is not true".

But that isn't the sentence being talked about, so it IS a RED HERRING.
It seems to be one of your favorite tactic, that when you don't understand something, you change the topic to something that seems "close enough" that you think you can argue.
That just proves you don't understand the original problem.

 

Proving you have run out of thoughts that actually relate to the problem.
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and if so, doesn't that mean that your True(L, x) just returned the false value for an input that was, by your definitions, true?
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How does that work?
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It must work the same as Prolog and detect cycles
in its evaluation graph.

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Nope. As shown above, Prolog can't handle this logic system.
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Yes, perhaps in a logic system fully handlable by Prolog, you can probably define a truth primitive. Since most real work in formal logic isn't in such systems, that is uninteresting.
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 *This knowledge ontology*
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
model of the general knowledge of the actual world.
 is an inheritance hierarchy of formalized natural language along
with formal language that is similar to type theory in the is has
an unlimited number or orders of logic.

And such an ontology can not be practically gathered, or manipulated.
Also, as I pointed out, has nothing to do with the problem you claim to be working on, which are about FORMAL SYSTEMS, each of which come with there own PRE-SPECIFIED set of axioms, that may or may not be parts of the accepted "general knowledge of the world".

 

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Deflect again and I will just point out that you have refused to answer because you are just admitting you can't figure out how to fix your broken system.

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As I predicted, you are just proving you don't even understand the system that is being talk about, It is just like you claim that you can't show that 2 + 3 = 5 to a person that doesn't understan Numbers.
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You can't show the problem of a truth predicate to someone that doesn't understand how logic really works.
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 You are incorrect on this point yet doing better than the leading
experts in the field simply because you fully understand that
"This sentence is not true." is definitely not a truth bearer.

But p := ~True(L, p) MUST be if True is a Truth Predicate, by the definition of a Truth Predicate, unless you are trying to work in some strange logic system that doesn't match what is generally assumed (things like ~ doesn't actually mean NOT in the conventional manner).
Your claim that it isn't, just shows your ignorance of the definitions of Formal Logic. Not surprizing given your history of actually ignoring the truth and going by your incorrect self-evident ideas.

 

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After all, you have proven that just because you thinkl something is self-evedently true, doesn't mean that it is true, as you sense of self-evedent is just broken.

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