Re: Truth Bearer or Truth Maker

On 7/24/2024 4:44 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But obviously sometimes sentences are
decidable, and sometimes not. Since
this depends on "True" and "L".
>

 But when we talk about "decidability" this is actually
only a misnomer for self-contradictory.
 

Actually modern logic does it much simpler,
you don't need to prescribe or explain what
a "True" and "L" does, in that you repeat
>

 Tarski "proved" that True(L,x) cannot be consistently defined
because he was simply too stupid to know that the Liar Paradox
is not a truth bearer. Most of the greatest experts in this
field are still too stupid.
 

nonsense like for example:
>
 > A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
 > that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
 > in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
 > means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.
>
Its much much easier to define a "logic".
You just take a language of sentences S.
And define a "logic" L as a subset of S.
>

 No we specify the whole foundation of every True(L,x)
that includes logic then we can make concrete examples
that are simple enough that ordinary people can understand
the mathematical incompleteness is nonsense.
 "A fish" can never be proven or refuted because it is
not a declarative sentence.
 "What time is it?" can never be proven or refuted
because it is not a declarative sentence.
 "This sentence is not true" can never be proven or
refuted because it is not a semantically correct
declarative sentence.
 

You can imagine that L was defined as follows:
>
L := { A e S | True(L, A) }
>
But this is not necessarely the case how L is
conceived, or how L comes into being.
>

 I have no idea what the Hell A e S means.
If you mean A ∈ S then just say that.
 

So a logic L is just a set of sentences. You
don't need the notion truth maker or truth bearer
at all, all you need to say you have some L ⊆ S.
>

 The foundation of analytic truth is a set of sentences
that have been stipulated to have the semantic property
of Boolean true. Care are animals even if physical reality
never existed.
 

You can then study such L's. For example:
- classical logic
- intuitionistic logic
- etc..
>

 I don't go through all that convoluted mess.
I start at the top of the hierarchy.
 True(L,x) means x has been stipulated to be true or x
is derived by applying truth preserving operations to
stipulated truths.
 

olcott schrieb:

On 7/24/2024 3:34 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But truth bearer has another meaning.
The more correct terminology is anyway
truth maker, you have to shift away the
>
focus from the formula and think it is
a truth bearer, this is anyway wrong,
since you have two additional parameters
your "True" and your language "L".
>
So all that we see here in expression such as:
>
[~] True(L, [~] A)
>
Is truth making, and not truth bearing.
In recent years truth making has received
some attention, there are interesting papers
concerning truth makers. And it has
>
even a SEP article:
>
Truthmakers
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/
>

>
Because the received view has never gotten past Quine's
nonsense rebuttal of the analytic synthetic distinction
no other expert on truth-maker theory made much progress.
>
{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}
conquers any of Quine's gibberish.
>
A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.
>

A world of truthmakers?
https://philipp.philosophie.ch/handouts/2005-5-5-truthmakers.pdf
>

>
This seems at least reasonably plausible yet deals with things besides
{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}
>

olcott schrieb:
>
 > The key difference is that we no long use the misnomer
 > "undecidable" sentence and instead call it for what it
 > really is an expression that is not a truth bearer, or
 > proposition in L.

>

>