Re: Analytical truth redefined so that Quine can understand that bachelors are unmarried

On 03/18/2024 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/18/2024 11:33 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 03/18/2024 03:30 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
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Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily coming
from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth. Philosophy
leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth can be
verified on the basis of its meaning.
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Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly divided
from other forms of truth:

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It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
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(1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and

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Truth is not a matter of definition.
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(2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
applying truth preserving operations.

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Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
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Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
all but affirmative sentences.
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Nah, an idea of "absolute truth" can arrive from simply
considering a theory where there's a language that only
has truisms, a "Comenius language",

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In other words only semantic tautologies that are self-evidently true
are included.
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In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is a
proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
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then it results that
the Russell set is the same as the Liar sentence,

I don't know what you mean by: "the Russell set"
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then that's only a prototype of a first fallacy or
contradiction, then that it provides both all the
cases for forward inference and a case for deductive
inference, at once, together.
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Things such as {cats are animals} are stipulated to be true thus
can be used as premises to deductive inference such that the
conclusion is defined to be a necessary consequence of its premises.
This eliminates things such as the principle of explosion.
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So, the "metaphysics", of such a thing, and "true theory"
or "a theory of truth", has that it's purely a matter of
reason, then insofar as that both deists and non-deists
"we have a metaphysic, and, deism is super-scientific",
to exclude deism from scientism, while still making it
so that formally both deism and non-deism are irrelevant,
in "a least metaphysics", in a sort of Hegelian approach
and Aristotle would approve, as a Plato's ideal and for
Kant only the sublime Ding-an-Sich, only that much greater
and within itself, this way there can certainly be a theory,
at all, "A Theory", then not so much that we can know it,
but we can ascertain it and attain to it, and it is,
and it's true.
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I sort of get into this in my podcasts under "Philosophical
Foreground" and some 10,000's posts on sci.logic and so on.
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https youtube /@rossfinlayson
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If this is an introduction to, "sci.lang", here the
notion is of "a Comenius language", which is a universe
of objects of the theory of language, all true, ...,

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Yes this seems to be what I am meaning.
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then according to comprehension, one excluded, ...,
"elementary primitives of ur-language",
for a course of axiomless natural deduction.
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Alternatively every sentence could be construed as an axiom.
Or more simply that a set of necessary consequences are derived
from stipulated truths. The latter essentially taking on the
role of an axiom.
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About the affirmative and negative, negatory, one idea
to consider is that the language actually starts with
all negatory, that just results a structure for affirmatory.
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When I study English grammar I consider Curme,
and when I diagram its structure it's after Tesniere,
according to the most published book as for a literary
and deconstructive account for its technical content,
or the logico-philosophical, it basically establishes
a space from nothing then also introduces that in
the beginning that there was a word, for the
synthetic/analytic distinction, as a usual holistic
monism, a usual holistic dual monism, and that
technically there's a way to relate that to there
being a teleology and ontology not either void the other.
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That's the point of my most recent podcasts,
re-connecting teleology and ontology, while
the idea of "a Comenius language a universe of
words", or statement, is about any old "A Theory",
at all, with regards to "truth" and "true".
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Doesn't say what it is - just says that it is.
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I think what you got there is usually called
a "world", vis-a-vis the "domain of discourse",
vis-a-vis the "universe", and for univocity and
haeccity.
It's also sort of familiar as the usual "model",
when the "model" is just a bag-of-facts, vis-a-vis
when a "model" is somehow a structure and all its
relations in the logical, mathematical universe,
and then the properly logical after that what that
all models, sort of like a usual development in
"classical", logic, here what's called "classical
quasi-modal", logic, though that you say that
there's no Principle of Explosion and no Ex Falso
Quodlibet, then though whether you've actually
sorted that out with Aristotle's eudamon, or not.
The, "Russell set", is the "set of all sets that
don't contain themselves". It doesn't exist in
usual ordinary axiomatic set theory, because,
it's description contradicts itself, because
according to free comprehension, it does, and
doesn't contain itself.
So, "the ordinal of all ordinals, contains
lesser ordinals, contains itself", usually
sort of doesn't exist, and usually because
it's explicitly prohibited non-well-foundedness,
that transitively it would exhibit a counter-example.
Then, the Liar is pretty simple, "this sentence
is False", or, in a language of all truisms,
"one of these sentences is false", that it is
and isn't, it's one of the most usual things
that confounds and complicates Tertium Non Datur
the Principle or Law of Excluded Middle, in
terms of principles, rules, and laws.
The relevance logic is a key thing, because what
it says is that sentences that don't share relation
in terms, say nothing about each other, so, it
prohibits Ex Falso Quodlibet as usually extended
to claim "false antecendent" or "false consequent"
of "material implication", in usually "classical
quasi-modal logic", I'm a big fan of relevance logic,
because all logic can be done in it and "material
implication" is considered neither material nor implication.
So, if you need to interpret classical quasi-modal
logic, it's about a small world a bag-of-facts
that what it considers monotone and entailment, "is",
is a particular shallow non-contradiction-based-
on-contradiction, material implication. So,
interpreting that is made _contingent_ under
relevance logic, instead of erased and made,
"the unconscious", because, classical quasi-modal
logic, is neither modal nor temporal, it's just
a fragment of "real" entailment and the "real"
monotone of "all the relevant logic".
Then, here this notion of "Aristotle's and Maxwell's
daemons", one for information the other entropy,
help build out the complementary concepts,
the complementary duals, what get involved
in universals, the particulars.
So, it seems you have a sort of "quasi-modal quasi-modal",
logic, that you've added somewhere a stipulation
"don't follow POE" when your ground logic blindly does,
or rather, senselessly, when there's otherwise a usual
sort of approach to prefix any syllogism with all
what's contingent about the "quasi-modal", so then
that what sticks out is its "truth tables", with
regards to, "material implication", _aren't_,
instead what results, "quasi-truth tables of
classical quasi-modal logic". Thusly, those
aren't confused with, truth tables, which have
it so that they fulfill all of De Morgan's laws
of logic the deterministic, the causal, and
the directly implicative, specifically, the contrapositive.
A.k.a., "the principle of deduction".