Re: Analytical truth redefined so that Quine can understand that bachelors are unmarried

On 03/20/2024 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 03/20/2024 11:19 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 03/20/2024 08:43 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/20/2024 9:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
 > On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
 >> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
 >>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
 >>>
 >>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
 >>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
 >>>>>
 >>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
 >>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute
truth.
 >>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical
truth
 >>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
 >>>>>>
 >>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that
bachelors are
 >>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
 >>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
 >>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
 >>>>>
 >>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
 >>>>>
 >>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
 >>>>>
 >>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the
basis of
 >>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true
sentences.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in
comp.thery
 >>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually
excludes
 >>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
 >>>>>
 >>>>
 >>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
 >>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
 >>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
 >>>> these Facts.
 >>>
 >>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
 >>> yield different analytical truths.
 >>>
 >>
 >> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
 >> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
 >> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
 >> of human reasoning.
 >>
 >
 > Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
 > the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
 > aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
 > then there's the empirical and what results
 > why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
 > results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
 > beliefs.
 >
Every element of the relevant details of the current model of the actual
world would seem to be able to be encoded in formalized natural language
semantics. Relevant details are defined as the degree of details
required to perform at least the equivalent of human reasoning.
>
 > I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
 > alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
 > belief, then with regards to that not being,
 > "infallibilistic".
 >
Actual Facts are stipulated to be true (like in Prolog)
Expressions of language that are a necessary consequence
of these Facts are also true. This gets a little trickier
with inductive inference and judgement calls.
"Pluto is no longer considered a planet."is true.
>
 > This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
 > A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
 > a major belief system historically,
 > is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
 > then that Russell who is secular, once joked
 > that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
 > of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
 > extension infallible, and that's considered
 > fallacious, and specious.
 >
The Principle of Explosion is hokum and tried to override and
supersede the way the semantic logical entailment really works.
>
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
nevertheless to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be
invalid. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>
The above also contradicts the way the semantic logical entailment
really works. P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>
 > So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
 > the entire world is specious.
 >
Not at all. These are called propositional attitudes.
They are not necessarily true themselves they are merely
the positions that some people really hold.
>
 > The human reasoning then these days is that
 > we have an entire philosophy of science, and
 > the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
 > and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
 > and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
 > side the examination of reason of being by reason
These things are anchored in value judgments that are themselves
anchored in subjectivity.
>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism
Is correct only when the optimal criterion measure is the basis.
>
 > in being, examination and test, and ontology from
 > the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
 > to those being among the usual concepts and
 > exploring the fuller dialectic including
 > deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
 > fundamental.
 >
Deconstruction denotes the pursuing of the meaning of a text to the
point of exposing the supposed contradictions and internal oppositions
upon which it is founded—supposedly showing that those foundations are
irreducibly complex, unstable, or impossible.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction
>
The model of the actual world can be completely coherent.
Propositional attitudes account for subjective beliefs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_attitude
>
 > It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
 > and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
 > and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
 >
 > When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
 > their truths aren't common, that's to be
 > considered from the universe of syllogism,
 > that they all have to be commonly true together,
 > and that involves that things change and so
 > that the modality is a temporality, and all
 > else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
 > which makes a statistical interpretation,
 > which makes a scientific interpretation.
 >
Yes these differences account for knowledge of things
changing over time. Pluto is no longer considered a planet.
This "fact" has been updated.
>
 > Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
 > there's an opposite, for any stipulation
 > there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
 > so that there's no default certification
 > of stipulation, and it results rather
*This is my system of categorically exhaustive reasoning*
Different premises derive different conclusions about the same
subject matter. Exactly one of a set of categorically exhaustive
and mutually exclusive premises must be true.
>
 > that our canon and dogma and doctrine
 > guides our conscience, the logical conscience
 > and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
 > formalists and a common world of logical
 > and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
 > in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
 > at all.
 >
As far as moral right and wrong goes adhering to a value system
that derives the maximum beneficial consequences is the objectively
correct one.
>
The definition of maximum beneficial consequences seems to
have subjective aspects. For example maximizing happiness
(the subjective sense of well being) may have different
fulfillment for differing individuals.
>
 > This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
 > except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
 >
 >
 > Matters of definition ....
 >
Most of the knowledge of the actual world does seem to be a matter
of definition. The concept of "cats are animals" would seem to
remain true even if every experience of a cat is actually the experience
of an alien android perfectly disguised as a cat.
>
 >
 > It seems that instead what you have there
 > is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
 > statements of fact collected as common sense",
 > and this means specifically in the notion
 > that it is the _senses_ that describe the
 > phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
Yes even if every details of reality is a mere figment of the
imagination our mental model of reality continues to remain
coherent and thus an accurate model of what at least appear
to be a set of physical sensations.
>
The key most important possible error in the human model of
the actual world might be the human notion of cause-and-effect.
>
It does seem to be the case that our expectations about what
events will occur (held silently within the mind with no
corresponding physical actions) do have an effect on which
events will occur and how they will occur.
>
 > vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
 > relation to the noumenological, then as with
Assuming away the possibility that our model of the world
is inaccurate. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomology
True by definition: {cats are animals} is impossibly false.
Considered true yet not True by definition is possibly false.
>
 > regards to usually a platonistic world where
 > the only common truths are purely logical and
 > by extension mathematical, while all else is
True by definition.
>
 > only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
 > for a conscientious philosophy of science,
 > interpretations for considerations what so
 > result statistical and scientific experiment.
 >
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aletheia
Truth by definition is always necessarily true everything
else construed as true is less certainly true.
>
 > So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
 > is contingent the lineage of its body
 > of definition, in matters of definition.
 > No, all of the things that are true by definition are
necessarily true.
>
 >
 > "Anybody who buys or sells material implication
 > is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
 >
That is why I recently replaced this with
P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>
This seems to be superior to relevance logic in that it
seems all encompassing, whereas relevance logic has a more
limited scope.
>
 >
 > So, "an ontology via specification and
 > various graphical relations", isn't much
 > more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
 > that if that's codified in the reasoning its
 > beliefs, has that humans examine and test
 > their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
 > the non-logical is always contingent,
 > that otherwise is just a bot.
 > ("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
 >
 > Then it's "matter of definition" as with
 > regards to matters of expectation, with regards
 > to matters of communication, what result
 > rather generally systems of information.
 >
>
>

>
Aristotle the other day:
>
If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition
embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction,
and if each science has its peculiar propositions
from which its peculiar conclusion is developed,
there there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific
question, and it is the interrogative form of the premisses
from which the 'appropriate' conclusion of each science
is developed. Hence it is clear that not every question
will be relevant to geometry, nor to medicine, nor to
any other science: only those questions will be geometrical
which form premisses for the proof of the theorems of geometry
or of any other science, such as optics, which uses the
same basic truths as geometry. Of the other sciences
the like is true. Of these questions the geometer is bound
to give his account, using the basic truths of geometry
in conjunction with his previous conclusions; of the
basic truths of the geometer, as such, is not bound to
give any account. The like is true of the other sciences.
There is a limit, then, to the questions which we may put
to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound
to answer all inquiries on each several subject, but only
such as fall within the defined field of his own science.
If, then, in controversy with a geometer qua geometer the
disputant confines himself to geometry and proves anything
from geometrical premisses, he is clearly to be applauded;
if he goes outside these he will be at fault, and obviously
cannot even refute the geometer except accidentally. One should
therefore not discuss geometry among those who are not geometers,
for in such company an unsound argument will pass unnoticed.
This is correspondingly true in the other science.
>
- Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 12, McKeon, trans.
>
>
Here as a matter of usage, "accident" means in the
ordering of the consideration of things, "accidence".
>
Then, 'bound to give any account', includes both the
notions of 'can' and 'must', capability and obligation,
and the negative applied, implies 'can not', and, 'must not'.
I.e., capability and obligation are combined: conscientiousness.
>
He sort of lays it into "sophists" as unconscientious.
>
"... the reason being that 'ungeometrical', like
'unrhythmical', is equivocal, meaning in the one case
not geometry at all, in the other bad geometry? It
is this error, i.e. error based on premisses of this kind -
'of' the science but false - that is the contrary of science.
In mathematics the formal fallacy is not so common,
because it is the middle term in which the ambiguity lies,
since the major is predicated of the hole of the middle
and the middle of the whole of the minor (the predicate
of course never has the prefix 'all'); and in mathematics
one can, so to speak, see these middle terms with an
intellectual vision, while in dialectic the ambiguity
may escape detection. E.G. 'Is every circle a figure?'
A diagram shows that this is so, but the minor premiss
'Are epics circles?' is shown by the diagram to be false.
If a proof has an inductive minor premiss, one should
not bring an 'objection' against it. For since every
premiss must be applicable to a number of cases (otherwise
it will not be true in every instance, which, since the
syllogism proceeds from universals it must be), then
assuredly the same is true of an 'objection'; since
premisses and 'objections' are so far the same that
anything which can be validly advanced as an 'objection'
must be such that it could take the form of a premiss,
either demonstrative or dialectical."
>
>
>
So, for Aristotle's dialectic (and the demonstratives)
and Hegel's dialectic, is the idea that Hegel's dialectic
is always the further synthesis, here with the idea
that "Aristotle's eudamon has a fuller dialectic and
a scientific synthesis", in terms of any matters of
contradiction, vis-a-vis any matters of non-contradiction
(in mutual relevance).
>
Aristotle separates mathematical reasoning from
dialectical disputations, ...
>
"A science expands not by the interposition of
fresh middle terms, but by the apposition of
fresh extreme terms. [... direct implication...]"
>
"Knowledge of the fact
differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact."
>
>
>
So, introducing "the reciprocals", Aristotle
makes for a modern accoutrement of "Aristotle's daemon",
to take any argument, provide it a novel accidence,
and whether it's same, i.e. in the same modality,
here temporality, having a fuller dialectic,
and demonstratively.
>
That's also direct for De Morgan and the
rules of causality by definition the contrapositive,
which "material implication" also fails to fulfill.
>
That "the weak dialectic" is any old rhetorical disputation,
or an argument, has that a "fuller dialectic"
makes for that "the basic truths" are mathematics',
science's, those being about it, and that the
"reasoned facts" then are not withstanding sophism.
Then: that they are, "reasoned facts".
>
Then here "geometrical" is "logical".
>
>
I don't see why think that that relevance logic
is limited in scope, considering any matters of,
"true", relation, at all. I think instead that
that's specious and sophist and just reflects
that it takes more time to get right, or,
what you want.
>
The larger the bag-of-facts or the body-of-knowledge
gets, the more things are related. This is why it's
mostly great to have a least and simplest theory
that's always "reasoning the fact", vis-a-vis,
mathematical reasoning, science, domains, genera,
then particulars, it results a science.
>
So, the great old bag-of-fact, it's baggage.
Some of which Aristotle's daemon treats like
a Samsonite baggage handler, with the idea
of not having "neither material, nor implied",
values in the truth tables.
>
I.e., it all goes through the wash,
and there is no accidence.
>
>
>
>
>

>
>
Samuelson was an economist,
he defined a "Utility Function",
that every quantity and qualia,
has a value in a common, inelastic milieu,
that a factory had value and ore had value,
that clean air had value and a flower had value,
that any thing and even opinions, had a value.
>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Samuelson
>
Even his utility function has a value.
>
Two cents.
>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_two_cents
>
>
This is, "optimization", here is reasoning,
what combinations, of quantified quantities,
result qualities, of quantities, as of,
a maximum, or a minimum, "all else held constant".
>
So, that's pretty easy in quasi-modal theory,
just add what you want it to be and it's so.
>
Is it objective, though?
>
So, the quasi-modal implementation, meets a criterion,
that among cheap, fast, and thoroughly coherent,
it's figured that in computing that time is money
so "fast" suffices that it's optimum, yet,
incorporating that for example it has to consume
otherwise its own inferences as _tabula rasa_ or
blank slate, ab initio, those quasi-modal outputs,
are _not_ truth values.
>
It's dynamics.
>
>
Then, here, about the objects of the logical universe,
there is infinity and continuity and these kinds of
things, there's "all", there's a universal quantifier
to disambiguate any/each/every/all, there's an existential
quantifier to disambiguate plural/some/one, there are
sentential diagrams to disambiguate in order and accidence,
and types and categories to disambiguage inverse and reciprocal,
all the inner and outer products of all the complementary duals,
and the graph of relation and where it meets and doesn't
and where it ends.
>
So, it's simplest to have that theory first, then,
every other notion results "reasoned fact, about reasoned fact".
>
Much less baggage.
>
>
>
>

An ontology and knowledge base of course
is a necessary thing.  We might start with the
kingdoms as domains animal, vegetable, or mineral,
for genera and species, then individuals, of groups,
phyla and taxa, phylogeny and taxonomy,
these kinds of things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)
Where fungi fit or live rust and these things,
is about natural things.
Genome, proteome, viriome, bacteriome,
there's an ontology, it follows from the
central dogma of molecular biology,
which is that DNA is a thing and things change.
It's similar with these taxonomies these ontologies,
over time they change categories, types, reasonings,
things change.  (Fungi now live in funga, live rust is a thing.)
(Some have that "life must be carbon-based because
only carbon-rings make sequences with enough
information", but, "live rust", steam vents, and so on.)
"Aristotle classified animal species ...
Theophrastus wrote a parallel work ... on plants."
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_(biology)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_algebra
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relation_algebra
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lindenmayer%20systems
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baire_space_(set_theory)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantor_space
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact_space
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuity
So, it's much better from here to think about
what you write in terms of considerations of
the domain and the world and the ontology
and its interpretation, vis-a-vis, that, you seem
to be in an infinite loop otherwise about
your halting problem.