Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge

On 4/2/25 12:05 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/2/2025 4:43 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-04-01 18:00:56 +0000, olcott said:
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On 4/1/2025 1:36 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-31 18:29:32 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/31/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-30 11:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
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You have never expressed any disagreement with the starting points of
Tarski's proof. You have ever claimed that any of Tarski's inferences
were not truth preserving. But you have claimed that the last one of
these truth preservin transformation has produced a false conclusion.
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It is ALWAYS IMPOSSIBLE to specify True(X) ∧ ~Provable(X)
(what Tarski proved) when-so-ever True(X) ≡ Provable(X).
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

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Tarski's proof was not about provability. Gödel had already proved
that there are unprovable true sentences. Tarski's work is about
definability.

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https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Step (3) is self-contradictory, thus his whole proof fails.

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Irrelevant. As Traski clearly points out, (3) can be derived from (1) and
(2) with a truth preserving transformation.
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 (3) is false, thus his whole proof is dead.
 

And if (3) is false, then one of (1) or (2) must be false, and for those to be false it means some assumption that went into them must be false, and the only assumption, other than the definition of the logic system that he used, was that a Truth Predicate exists.
Thus, all you are doing is confirming his conclusion, and proving that you just don't understand how logic actual works.