Re: Analytical truth redefined so that Quine can understand that bachelors are unmarried

On 3/20/2024 9:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
 > On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
 >> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
 >>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
 >>>
 >>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
 >>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
 >>>>>
 >>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
 >>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
 >>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
 >>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
 >>>>>>
 >>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
 >>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
 >>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
 >>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
 >>>>>
 >>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
 >>>>>
 >>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
 >>>>>
 >>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
 >>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
 >>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
 >>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
 >>>>>
 >>>>
 >>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
 >>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
 >>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
 >>>> these Facts.
 >>>
 >>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
 >>> yield different analytical truths.
 >>>
 >>
 >> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
 >> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
 >> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
 >> of human reasoning.
 >>
 >
 > Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
 > the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
 > aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
 > then there's the empirical and what results
 > why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
 > results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
 > beliefs.
 >
Every element of the relevant details of the current model of the actual
world would seem to be able to be encoded in formalized natural language
semantics. Relevant details are defined as the degree of details
required to perform at least the equivalent of human reasoning.
 > I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
 > alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
 > belief, then with regards to that not being,
 > "infallibilistic".
 >
Actual Facts are stipulated to be true (like in Prolog)
Expressions of language that are a necessary consequence
of these Facts are also true. This gets a little trickier
with inductive inference and judgement calls.
"Pluto is no longer considered a planet."is true.
 > This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
 > A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
 > a major belief system historically,
 > is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
 > then that Russell who is secular, once joked
 > that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
 > of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
 > extension infallible, and that's considered
 > fallacious, and specious.
 >
The Principle of Explosion is hokum and tried to override and
supersede the way the semantic logical entailment really works.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
nevertheless to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be
invalid. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
The above also contradicts the way the semantic logical entailment
really works. P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
 > So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
 > the entire world is specious.
 >
Not at all. These are called propositional attitudes.
They are not necessarily true themselves they are merely
the positions that some people really hold.
 > The human reasoning then these days is that
 > we have an entire philosophy of science, and
 > the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
 > and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
 > and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
 > side the examination of reason of being by reason
These things are anchored in value judgments that are themselves
anchored in subjectivity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism
Is correct only when the optimal criterion measure is the basis.
 > in being, examination and test, and ontology from
 > the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
 > to those being among the usual concepts and
 > exploring the fuller dialectic including
 > deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
 > fundamental.
 >
Deconstruction denotes the pursuing of the meaning of a text to the
point of exposing the supposed contradictions and internal oppositions
upon which it is founded—supposedly showing that those foundations are
irreducibly complex, unstable, or impossible.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction
The model of the actual world can be completely coherent.
Propositional attitudes account for subjective beliefs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_attitude
 > It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
 > and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
 > and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
 >
 > When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
 > their truths aren't common, that's to be
 > considered from the universe of syllogism,
 > that they all have to be commonly true together,
 > and that involves that things change and so
 > that the modality is a temporality, and all
 > else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
 > which makes a statistical interpretation,
 > which makes a scientific interpretation.
 >
Yes these differences account for knowledge of things
changing over time. Pluto is no longer considered a planet.
This "fact" has been updated.
 > Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
 > there's an opposite, for any stipulation
 > there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
 > so that there's no default certification
 > of stipulation, and it results rather
*This is my system of categorically exhaustive reasoning*
Different premises derive different conclusions about the same
subject matter. Exactly one of a set of categorically exhaustive
and mutually exclusive premises must be true.
 > that our canon and dogma and doctrine
 > guides our conscience, the logical conscience
 > and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
 > formalists and a common world of logical
 > and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
 > in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
 > at all.
 >
As far as moral right and wrong goes adhering to a value system
that derives the maximum beneficial consequences is the objectively
correct one.
The definition of maximum beneficial consequences seems to
have subjective aspects. For example maximizing happiness
(the subjective sense of well being) may have different
fulfillment for differing individuals.
 > This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
 > except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
 >
 >
 > Matters of definition ....
 >
Most of the knowledge of the actual world does seem to be a matter
of definition. The concept of "cats are animals" would seem to
remain true even if every experience of a cat is actually the experience
of an alien android perfectly disguised as a cat.
 >
 > It seems that instead what you have there
 > is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
 > statements of fact collected as common sense",
 > and this means specifically in the notion
 > that it is the _senses_ that describe the
 > phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
Yes even if every details of reality is a mere figment of the
imagination our mental model of reality continues to remain
coherent and thus an accurate model of what at least appear
to be a set of physical sensations.
The key most important possible error in the human model of
the actual world might be the human notion of cause-and-effect.
It does seem to be the case that our expectations about what
events will occur (held silently within the mind with no
corresponding physical actions) do have an effect on which
events will occur and how they will occur.
 > vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
 > relation to the noumenological, then as with
Assuming away the possibility that our model of the world
is inaccurate. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomology
True by definition: {cats are animals} is impossibly false.
Considered true yet not True by definition is possibly false.
 > regards to usually a platonistic world where
 > the only common truths are purely logical and
 > by extension mathematical, while all else is
True by definition.
 > only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
 > for a conscientious philosophy of science,
 > interpretations for considerations what so
 > result statistical and scientific experiment.
 >
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aletheia
Truth by definition is always necessarily true everything
else construed as true is less certainly true.
 > So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
 > is contingent the lineage of its body
 > of definition, in matters of definition.
 > No, all of the things that are true by definition are
necessarily true.
 >
 > "Anybody who buys or sells material implication
 > is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
 >
That is why I recently replaced this with
P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
This seems to be superior to relevance logic in that it
seems all encompassing, whereas relevance logic has a more
limited scope.
 >
 > So, "an ontology via specification and
 > various graphical relations", isn't much
 > more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
 > that if that's codified in the reasoning its
 > beliefs, has that humans examine and test
 > their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
 > the non-logical is always contingent,
 > that otherwise is just a bot.
 > ("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
 >
 > Then it's "matter of definition" as with
 > regards to matters of expectation, with regards
 > to matters of communication, what result
 > rather generally systems of information.
 >
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott
"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
  Genius hits a target no one else can see."
  Arthur Schopenhauer