Re: DDD correctly emulated by HHH is correctly rejected as non-halting. --- You are not paying attention

On 2024-07-18 13:36:53 +0000, olcott said:

On 7/18/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-07-17 13:14:43 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 7/17/2024 2:08 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-07-16 14:46:40 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 7/16/2024 2:18 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-07-15 13:32:27 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 7/15/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-07-14 14:48:05 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 7/14/2024 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-07-13 12:18:27 +0000, olcott said:

 When the source of your disagreement is your own ignorance
then your disagreement has no actual basis.
 *You can comprehend this is a truism or fail to*
*comprehend it disagreement is necessarily incorrect*
Any input that must be aborted to prevent the non
termination of HHH necessarily specifies non-halting
behavior or it would never need to be aborted.
 Disagreeing with the above is analogous to disagreeing
with arithmetic.

 A lame analogy. A better one is: 2 + 3 = 5 is a proven theorem just
like the uncomputability of halting is.

 The uncomputability of halting is only proven when the problem
is framed this way: HHH is required to report on the behavior
of an input that was defined to do exactly the opposite of
whatever DDD reports.

 No, it is proven about the halting problem as that problem is.

 Which is simply a logical impossibility

 Yes, a halting decider is a logical impossibility, as can be and has
been proven.

 If it is a logical impossibility then it places no
actual limit on computation otherwise we would have
"the CAD problem" of the logical impossibility of making
a CAD system that correctly draws a square circle.

 A logical impossibility does place a limit on computation.
Otherwise it would be possible to build a CAD system that
can correctly draw a square circle.

 Of the set of possible things TM's can do them all.

Depends on the meanings of "possible" and "thing". Of things other than
computation no TM can do any. A Turing machine can determine whether
a sentence of Presburger arithmetic is provable but no Turing machine
can determine whether a sentence of Peano arithmetic is provable.

One of the possible things is for a TM to to be a quadrillion
times smarter than any human at anything requiring human intelligence.

Depends on the meaning of "smart" and how it is quantified. Often the
meaning of "smart" includes that a good solution is found in a short time.
Such meaning of "smart" is not even applicable to Turing machines as
there is no time in the theory of Turing machines. The nearest is the
number of steps needed for some computation, which is sometimes called
time, but there are no such steps in human thinking, so no comparison
can be made.

One thing isomorphic to the halting problem is the liar paradox.

No, the paradox is not isomorphic to the problem. There are more
details in the problem than in the paradox but isomorphism requires
the same number of details.

Not even God can correctly determine whether this sentence is
true or false: "This sentence is not true".

Why would God want to?
--
Mikko