Sujet : Re: This makes all Analytic(Olcott) truth computable --- truth-bearer
De : polcott333 (at) *nospam* gmail.com (olcott)
Groupes : sci.logicDate : 03. Sep 2024, 14:58:32
Autres entêtes
Organisation : A noiseless patient Spider
Message-ID : <vb715o$3b4ub$3@dont-email.me>
References : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
User-Agent : Mozilla Thunderbird
On 9/3/2024 5:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:44:57 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 13:41:57 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 9/1/2024 7:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-08-31 12:18:20 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 8/31/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-08-30 14:45:32 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 8/30/2024 8:36 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-08-29 13:36:00 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 8/29/2024 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-08-28 12:14:47 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 8/28/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-08-24 03:26:39 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 8/23/2024 3:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-08-22 13:23:39 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 8/22/2024 7:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-08-21 12:47:37 +0000, olcott said:
>
>
Formal systems kind of sort of has some vague idea of what True
means. Tarski "proved" that there is no True(L,x) that can be
consistently defined.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Tarski%27s_undefinability_theorem#General_form
>
*The defined predicate True(L,x) fixed that*
Unless expression x has a connection (through a sequence
of true preserving operations) in system F to its semantic
meanings expressed in language L of F then x is simply
untrue in F.
>
Whenever there is no sequence of truth preserving from
x or ~x to its meaning in L of F then x has no truth- maker
in F and x not a truth-bearer in F. We never get to x is
undecidable in F.
>
Tarski proved that True is undefineable in certain formal systems.
Your definition is not expressible in F, at least not as a definition.
>
>
Like ZFC redefined the foundation of all sets I redefine
the foundation of all formal systems.
>
You cannot redefine the foundation of all formal systems. Every formal
system has the foundation it has and that cannot be changed. Formal
systems are eternal and immutable.
>
>
Then According to your reasoning ZFC is wrong because
it is not allowed to redefine the foundation of set
theory.
>
It did not redefine anything. It is just another theory. It is called
a set theory because its terms have many similarities to Cnator's sets.
>
It <is> the correct set theory. Naive set theory
is tossed out on its ass for being WRONG.
>
There is no basis to say that ZF is more or less correct than ZFC.
>
A set containing itself has always been incoherent in its
isomorphism to the concrete instance of a can of soup so
totally containing itself that it has no outside surface.
The above words are my own unique creation.
>
There is no need for an isomorphism between a set an a can of soup.
There is nothing inherently incoherent in Quine's atom. Some set
theories allow it, some don't. Cantor's theory does not say either
way.
>
>
Quine atoms (named after Willard Van Orman Quine) are sets that only contain themselves, that is, sets that satisfy the formula x = {x}.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urelement#Quine_atoms
>
Wrongo. This is exactly isomorphic to the incoherent notion of a
can of soup so totally containing itself that it has no outside
boundary.
>
As I already said, that isomorphism is not needed. It is not useful.
>
It proves incoherence at a deeper level.
>
No, it does not. If you want to get an incoherence proven you need
to prove it yourself.
>
>
When you try to imagine a can of soup that soup totally contains
itself that it has no outside boundary you can see that this is impossible because it is incoherent.
>
It requires simultaneous mutually exclusive properties.
(a) It must have an outside surface because all physical
things have an outside surface.
>
Perhaps physical things in some sense have an outside surface but
that surface is not a part of the thing. We get the imression of
a surface because the resolution of our eyes and other senses is
too coarse to observe the small details of physical things.
>
>
No it has an actual surface. When we pick up a ball
we touch its surface. If is had no outer surface we
could not pick up a ball.
>
(b) It must not have an outside surface otherwise it is
not totally containing itself.
>
It hasn't.
>
>
If it has no outside surface then it does not physically exist
In that case nothing physically exists. Every outside surface is
merely an illusion.
Nothing that no outside surface exists.
Since I can touch a cup with my fingers
this proves that the cup and my fingers
have an outside surface.
A set containing itself is isomorphic to a can
of soup containing itself. In both cases they
cannot have an outside surface.
The physically existing thing must have out
outside surface proves that the can does not
physically exist.
The the Venn diagram of a set that includes itself
as a member can at best shown a diagram of a pair
of identical sets with overlapping boundaries proves
that a set containing itself cannot exist. It has
always been a misconception.
For one set to be actually contained within another
one this contained set must with inside of the boundaries
of its container set.
-- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Geniushits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Analytic Expressions of language not linked to their semantic meaning are simply untrue
Re: Analytic Expressions of language not linked to their semantic meaning are simply untrue