Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases

On 2024-09-10 02:48:11 +0000, Richard Damon said:

On 9/9/24 9:14 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/7/2024 8:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 9/7/24 9:28 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
 

On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:

*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
 knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
 

 With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
 My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
 With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

 What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

 For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

 If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
 

 I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

 As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
 

If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

 *An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
 ...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

 The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
 

 The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth preserving operations) to Facts.

 But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

 The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.
 

 Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
 Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.
 

 Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't actually know what you are talking about.

 I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.
 

 Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.

Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.
--
Mikko