Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context.

On 2025-03-19 01:57:18 +0000, olcott said:

On 3/18/2025 9:30 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-18 13:36:04 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:

Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:

 We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!

That does not disprove Tarski.
 

 He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
 

  But if x is what you are saying is

 A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.

 Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false, but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false, becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a contradiction in the system.
 That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows how stupid you are.
 

 True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.

 Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length.
 

 This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.

 But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity.
 Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta-systems, Tarski proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about, which creates the problem statement.
 

 It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
 

 Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references.
 And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed can be done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system must have.
 Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are talking about.

 We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.

 A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic
with equivalence and the following additional symbols:

 I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.

 That kind of language should be able to express some kind of semantics
of itself. But it may be hard to prevent a different interpretaion of
the same language from specifying different semantics for itself.
 

 All of the semantics is formalized syntactically with no
separate interpretation needed that is why Montague semantics
is called Montague Grammar.

Assuming that the intended semantic of Montague Grammar is applied.
If you apply different semantics a different result may be possible.

It is all formalizes as relations between finite strings that
may be abbreviated as GUIDs.
 

The language must be expressive enough to fully
encode any and all details of each element of the
entire body of human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language. Davidson semantics
provides another encoding.

 Including future additions to human general knowledge.
 

YES
 

To address the objection to these forms of encoding
that they ignore the important source of meaning
of linguistics pragmatics context, what I am proposing
also includes a situation specific knowledge ontology
that directly encode the full context of the specific
situation.

 Your proposal means a lot of work and therefore a long time.

 Not with LLM  systems.

Even with them. Of course having powerful tools helps.
--
Mikko