Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context.

On 3/19/2025 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-19 01:57:18 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 3/18/2025 9:30 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-18 13:36:04 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:

Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:

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We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!

That does not disprove Tarski.
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He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
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But if x is what you are saying is

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A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.

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Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false, but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false, becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a contradiction in the system.
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That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows how stupid you are.
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True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.

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Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length.
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This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.

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But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity.
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Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta-systems, Tarski proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about, which creates the problem statement.
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It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
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Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references.
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And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed can be done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system must have.
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Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are talking about.

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We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.

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A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic
with equivalence and the following additional symbols:

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I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.

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That kind of language should be able to express some kind of semantics
of itself. But it may be hard to prevent a different interpretaion of
the same language from specifying different semantics for itself.
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All of the semantics is formalized syntactically with no
separate interpretation needed that is why Montague semantics
is called Montague Grammar.

 Assuming that the intended semantic of Montague Grammar is applied.
If you apply different semantics a different result may be possible.
 

It is merely relational connections between finite strings
thus encoding all of the semantics as these relations.
This is my original source of that:
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
That all boils down to different types of relations
between finite strings. The property of a relation is
itself a type of relation to another relation.

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Your proposal means a lot of work and therefore a long time.

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Not with LLM  systems.

 Even with them. Of course having powerful tools helps.
 

LLM systems reduce the workload from millions of labor
years to perhaps less than five years of calendar time.
The Cyc project took about 1000 labor years to hand
encode a tiny subset of human common sense.
Getting from Generative AI to Trustworthy AI:
What LLMs might learn from Cyc
https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.04445
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer