Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning--

On 04/24/2024 11:10 AM, olcott wrote:

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On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can
likewise be used
for a
similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
is literally true whether or not Gödel
meant it
literally.
Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it
literally.
>

*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be
true
or false
proves
that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine
whether X is
true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>

>
It is easy to understand that
self-contradictory
mean
unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
Incomplete(F).
>

Which shows that F is incomplete, even
though X
cannot
possibly
be a
proposition in F because propositions must be
true or false.
>
A proposition is a central concept in the
philosophy of
language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often
characterized as
the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>

>

>
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the
truth is the
truth"
then
as with regards to logical positivism and a
sensitive,
thorough,
comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality
and
the
fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for
again a
stonger
logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal
"silver
thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the
truth is
the truth
is the
truth".
>
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at
least
two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a
scientific
model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical
model.
>
For all the things to be in one modality, is
that,
as a
model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable,
while at the
same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own
inner
consistency
and
inter-consistency, all the other models in the
entire modal
universe,
temporal.
>
>
Axioms are stipulations, they're
assumptions, and
there are
some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow
the
reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of
structural
relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
>

>
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a
self-evident
proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by
understanding its
meaning
without proof
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>
In the case of the correct model of the actual
world
stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations
are the
assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless
finite
strings.
>
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not
any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it
is a
self-evident
truth.
>
Expressions of language that are stipulated
to be
true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to
otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
foundation of
every
expression that are true on the basis of its
meaning.
>
The only other element required to define the
entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the
basis
of their
meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to
stipulated truths.
>

The axiomless, really does make for a richer
accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the
objects
of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless
deduction,
naturally.
>
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to
this,
the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>
One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and
contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the
world of
theory.)
>
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in
it.
>
>
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the
finite
is only
that,
though.
>
"Bigger:  not always worse."
>
>
>

>

>
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>
>

>
We cannot really understand the notion of true on
the
basis of
meaning
by only examining how this applies to real
numbers.
We must
broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
>
When we do this then we understand that a "dead
rat"
is not any
type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic
tautology that
cannot
possibly be false.
>
When we understand this then we have much deeper
insight into the
nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
tautologies.
>

There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
>
Which is not all of them.
>
>

>

>
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on
Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist,
yet a
sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
>
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's
"First Manifesto
..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its
own truth.
>
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not
necessarily
the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and
the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness
and
difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual
modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>

>
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with
that
self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It
seems
that most
people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply
"not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
>
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any
type of
{fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the
basis of
meaning}.
>

>
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a
geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry
justly
arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work
at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes
for
that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a
deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract
models.
>
Type, and category, have inversions, where for
example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king
of the
beasts.
>
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas,
there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
first-class.
>
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a
type
is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an
instance of
a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an
instance of
a type.
>
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for
type
inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each
other.
>
>
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of
words),
there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
>
Then, type theory and category theory, make for
great
bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a
relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class
abstraction,
theory, at all.
>
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a
science.
>
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a
true
ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>
>

>
A complete
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>
>
>
>
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the
same
thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>
There is definitely a true ontology even if every
aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will
never
be able to
experience what seems to be the physical
sensations of
taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>

>
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
>
You proved to yourself.
>

>
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to
the fifteen
floor
of your puppy then you know that there are expressions
that are
true on
the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get
this.
>

One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and
rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an
encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an
ontology, a
body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and
it's
not
invincible.
>

>
>
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
>

>
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the
world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a
modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's
just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>

>
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>

It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna
school
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer
and
Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a
true
theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well
exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what
are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time",
and
all
these aspects of the canon of the technical
philosophy
that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and
after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while
at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new
Hegelians.
>
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory,
as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper
metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for
both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a
Platonist, too.
>
>
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and
Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer
arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a
Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it
doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object
sense of
objectivity.
>
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have
thirteenth
floors, ...,
in some places.
>

The point is that because Quine could not
understand how
we know
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also
accept
that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>

>
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in
terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given
yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered
lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological
Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically
Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the
Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of
being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>

It would be organized such the reasoning with
formalized
natural language would be tree walks.
>

>
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
>
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>
>
>
>

>

>
>
>
That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only
makes sense
in terms among common types.
>

>
Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>

Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet
and
Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a
contradiction
about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely
_nothing_
about things.
>

>
Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald
Trump is
God}
In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive
inference.
>
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only
if it
takes a form
that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and
the conclusion
nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>
Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>

I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never
was the
Pope".
>
That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types,
and
it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and
it's
why there's "relevance logic" at all from what
otherwise
was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>
So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office
tower
or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct
properties
which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a
senses
or as with regards to any other collections of
tuples in
classes
and individuals and predicates that affect
descriptions of
relations, which of course must be non-circular and
non-contradictory.
>

>
The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that
already
exists
in the minds of most people is to provide computations
with
human
reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few
months what
would take humans millions of man-years.
>

It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>

>
The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already
spent
1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense.
Without
the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor
years
to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>

>
My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which

>
I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>

seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
account after modern fundamental formalisms
results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
also modern fundamental formalist foundations.

>
The sum total of all human general knowledge can be
encoded
in mostly in formalized natural language propositions.
Some
of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
One can explain the details of writing C programs in
English
yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>
We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we
need
is an enormously large number of axioms that are
stipulated
to have the Boolean value of true.
>
We can compress the space required for these axioms and
make
them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy
knowledge
ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and
facts
of the
world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>
{Cats} <are> {Animals}
{Animals} <are> {Living Things}
thus no need to store
{Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>
This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy.
UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>
>
>
>
>

>
>
A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
that the premises have to be drawable as random
draws and that it results the same deduction
regardless the order of the draws.
>

>
I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
{Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>

So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive
premises.
>

>
This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis
above:
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is
God}
>

That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive
inference,
has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>

>
If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic
relevance
directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of
logic
then we get
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is
God}
>

>
The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
"material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
a "truth table",

>
I totally agree with you on this. All of the other
people on
these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
derive nonsense.
>
I would replace implication with is a necessary
consequence
of.
Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary
relations.
∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>
They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive
cannot
possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief
that the
steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>
They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold
this
religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They
never
realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the
philosophy
of logic.
>

with regards to why a usual "model"
in such a setting also isn't a model and usual
"monotonicity"
in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
in such a setting also isn't, that being why what

>
A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be
entails.
>

you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's
Russell's
logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>
This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
bad ideas.
>

>
You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on
this.
The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had
their
answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and
Mathematicians
have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of
logic
are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
fully understands all of the reasoning that proves
otherwise.
>
When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
over their ears making sure to not hear a single word
while
shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>

The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in

a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're
_not_,
then those _are not_.
>

Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper
order
or there is no connection between inference steps.
>

>
The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
a model of reasoning can be very compact.
Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>

>
It is not actually largely bunk.
It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>
>
>
>
>
Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
the actual world.
>
This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
understanding
that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more
than yes/no
questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>

>
Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>

>
>

>
What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
about when the transfer principle applies and
a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal
quantifier,
into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
the result _direct implication_ carries and with
ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
and excludes any sort "paradox".
>
That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a,
just
reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
and the resulting logic large of relations, and not
necessarily
to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
and they're _two, different things_.
>
I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>
It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>
>
I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material
Implication
is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just
plain
old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's
rules
of logic
both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication",
which is
neither,
at all.
>
>
Russell: was never, the Pope.
>
>
>
Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S.
Peirce
and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the
universals
and
particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there
are as
well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier
disambiguation
and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency
the
modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>
(Judgment.)

>
The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there
really
are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.

>
SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
defining it), not all.
>
Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of
their
words.
>
Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>
The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the
words,
but its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry
and a series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>

>
We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the
fifteenth
floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of
meaning}.
>
The majority of people that were convinced there is no such
thing
as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine
utterly
failed to understand how we know that bachelors are
unmarried
are
simply wrong.

>
I don't think many people think that there are no statements
that are true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just
that the "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>

>
I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)

>
THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its
meaning since there does not exist any number g that satisfies
the
defined Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>
And this can be established by the infinite sequence of
steps of
checking every Natural Number against that relationship,
which is
the classical meaning of Semantically true,
>
And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>

I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>
*Principle of compositionality*
In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the
principle
of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a
complex
expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent
expressions
and the rules used to combine them.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>
I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
meaning that also includes the full discourse context.

>
How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>
The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words"
which is
what the full discourse context would provide, but the
sequence of
the logical arguement that proves it, which is something which
goes beyound "meaning" of the words.
>
>

>
Do you think that it is possible to:
take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this
puppy?
or would the total meaning of the expression make that
impossible?

>
Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>
Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of
logic,
which if that is all you have, can be complete because it
will be
finite.
>

>
Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we
know
that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is
vacuous
and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are
unmarried.
>
{true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between
finite
strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the
world.
>
*Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html

>
>
Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that
you have no answers to the replys and are just working on Red
Herring.
>
>
Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all
bachelors are
unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS
replaceable with each other, and that logic that is based on
that
is too imprecise, and we need to better define the rules of
logic
when doing such things.
>
The key point here is that while the classical definition of a
bachelor is a never married man (though some uses of the words
might include a man that was married but now nolonger has a
wife),
the word "unmarried" also has ranges of meaning from "never
married" to "currently not married" and thus the two words
can't
be considered truely equivalent words.

>
*Thanks for your apt analysis. I can't tolerate wading through
nonsense*
Once I understood that his conclusion was {true on the basis of
meaning}
is not viable I can't tolerate carefully examining how he
came up
with
that. He might as well have said that 2 + 3 = 5 is not true
because he
simply does not believe in numbers.
>

>
Except that you don't understand what he actually said,
because you
don;t understand the terminology, and you think because he says
things your don't understand that he must be wrong.
>
No, you are just too stupid to understand what he says.
>

>
I may not fully understand exact what he said.
I do know that {true on the basis of meaning} is
completely valid.

>
In the sense that if by the meaning of the words, the statement
MUST
ALWAYS be true, then the statement should have been an axiom of the
system or derivable from the axioms of the system.
>

>
Yes exactly. In the case of natural language semantics all of the
facts
of the world must be formalized natural language encoded in a
knowledge
ontology inheritance hierarchy.
True(L, x)  ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ x)
False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ ¬x)
Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, ¬x))
>

Note, that also means that the words and definitions used must be
valid in that logical system.
>
For instance, in a system like Mathematics, that doesn't define
what
animals are, the statement "Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True
Statement", even if a normally true statement in English,
because it
refers to things outs
>

>
The category of things that are cats is a proper subset of
the category of things that are animals. Even the categorical
propositions of the syllogism can properly encode this.
>

>

My concrete example that one cannot take the elevator of a
puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy conclusively proves
that {true on the basis of meaning} does have some instances.

>
And just shows that you believe the fallacy of proof by
example is
actually proper logic.
>

>
In logic and mathematics, proof by example (sometimes known as
inappropriate generalization) is a logical fallacy whereby the
validity
of a statement is illustrated through one or more examples or
cases—
rather than a full-fledged proof.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_example

>
Note, you said "Illustrated", which doesn't mean PROVE.
>

>
So then what I said is even less of a proof by example because
my example does prove an instance of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>

As an example, the statement that Mens names begin with P could be
"illustrated" with example like Peter and Paul, but that doesn't
show
that the statement is actually true, at least not if interpreted as
ALL Men's names begin with P.
>

>
It conclusively proves that it is true for at least two instances.
>

>
>
My proof by example does prove that the notion of
{true on the basis of meaning} is not invalid in every single
case.

>
Right, and no one says that it is invalid in every single case, so
you
are arguing a strawman, another fallacy.
>
Note, as shown above, True by the Meaning of the words is not even
always applicable.
>

>
*My unique insight into this issue is that*
{true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to relations
between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of meaning}
unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation}
(TotBoO)
>
Try and show that there is an exception to (TotBoM).
>

>
I never said I was generalizing to any other cases so there is no
error.
*The next step is testing the boundary conditions*

>
And that says you are trying to do so.
>

>
What are the closest counter-examples to
{true on the basis of meaning} when this

>
Which is an invalid arguement,
>

is limited to relations between finite strings?

>
But it doesn't work for ALL finite strings, so that case is outside
the boundery where it is a true statement, as shown above.
>

>
I cannot find any finite string that it does not work for except for
unknowns.
>

"All Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True Statement" in the field of
Arithmetic, because Cats and Animals are outside that field.
>

>
I HAVE NEVER EVERY BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE FIELD OF ARITHMETIC
I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE GENERIC NOTION OF
{true on the basis of meaning} that applies to everything
including arithmetic.
>

It also fails for the more general issue that your "finite string"
needs to be interpreted in the full context of the field you are
analyzing,
>

>
No interpretation needed when all of the details of all of the
meanings
are fully specified as axioms or derived form axioms.
>

>
The prior analytic / synthetic distinction was very blurry
my TotBoM/TotBoO distinction seems totally unequivocal.

>
Nope
>

>
Show all of the details of exactly how I am incorrect instead of the
merely dogmatic bluster of disagreement.
>

>

>
*My unique insight into this issue is that*
{true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to
relations
between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of
meaning}
unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation}
(TotBoO)

>
>
And, since you can't show how this lets you show that the
Pythogrean
Theorem it true in Plane Geometery, or that 2 + 3 = 5 (since you
fail to answer the challanges) you are just admitting that your
unique insight just works for TOY problems that don't really
matter,
and you are just too stupid to understand that restriction.
>

>
I don't have time to get into endless details. I can get into a
few key details. I do understand how the Peano axioms prove that
2 + 3 = 5. And since you do too and it is not a counter-example
to {true on the basis of meaning} it seems like an inessential
distraction. I don't have time for those.

>
It shows that True on the basis of meaning is not a sufficient
definition of truth. At best, True on the basis of meaning is a
method
to establish what might make sense as a primitive axiom of the
system,
if it can't easily be proven by existing axioms.
>

>
A "primitive" axiom system that has every single detail of the
accurate
model of the actual world would enable every aspect of human
reasoning
to be computable. To be actually feasible the main system would only
have general knowledge. A separate subsystem could have all of the
details of the current situation, ie the full discourse context.
>

Of course, that only happens once you pass the concept that the
definitions used need to be from the definitions of the system, and
the concepts are also in the system.
>
Since Definitions provide a base set of axioms, things that are
true
by definition should already be axioms or provable from them, if
they
are actually in the system.
>

>
It took the cyc project 100 labor years to manually encode the tiny
subset of human knowledge known as "common sense". We need to
leverage
something like LLM technology to make populating such an ontology
with
the rest of the general knowledge of the world.
>

>
An actual counter-example boundary condition to
{true on the basis of meaning} would be the next step.

>
Like "Cats are Animals" is not true in some (many) fields of study
because those fields don't HAVE "Cats" or "Animals"?
>

>
I have always only been talking about a formal system that
has all of the general knowledge of the actual world encoded
within it. Yes it does exclude unknown things.
>
We don't need to know whether the Goldbach conjecture is true
or false to prove that there is no publicly available evidence
of election fraud that could have possibly changed the outcome
of the 2020 presidential election.
>

>
You already know how the above two examples would be specified.
What we need are examples that are very tricky to specify.

>
They aren't that tricky, as I have shown even more for you.
>

>
The only thing that I recall that you have ever shown is that an
accurate model of the actual world must exclude unknowns.
>

>

>
Bachelor is simply assigned a range of semantic meanings that
are entirely defined in terms of other defined words.
>
We can easily 100% precisely define 10,000 different notions
of bachelor and give them their own unique index.

>
But we don't, so it doesn't matter.
>

>
Bachelor[0] = never married adult male
Bachelor[1] = not currently married adult male
Bachelor[951] having completed a four year degree.
>
In this case we can clearly see that the LHS is synonymous
to the RHS because the RHS is assigned to the LHS.
>

>
So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version
where every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely
state its
meaning, this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the
words you are using.
>

>
It conclusively proves that I fully addressed the objections that
you and Quine specified. If you think that I did not prove this
then show what I missed.

>
Nope. You may have answer the objections you understand, but you
still
don't understand the problem, because you are too stupid and you
logic
is too simple.
>

>
Then please state clearly the essence of the key details that I
missed.
I did prove every single detail of exactly and precisely how the
term
"bachelor" is synonymous to the set of constituent terms that
define its
meaning.
>
This seemed to be the whole issue that you elaborated. If I
did not sufficiently address words that you never said then
you must first say these words.
>

>

Until you publish this dictionary that FULLY defines all
shades of
meaning for every word, and then fully mark up every statement
you
right, you are just proving yourself to be a hypocrit, and a
liar.
>

>
Not at all and you know it. The architecture design is already
substantially implemented in the CYC project. They already spent
more than 1000 labor years on this over the last few decades.
>

>
Nope, you don't get it. Since Natural Language doesn't come with
the
tags, until you make natural language come with the tags, or
show an
algorithmic method to assign tags with 100% accuracys, you can't
use
them.
>

>
Sure you can. Each word has a finite set of sense meanings that
can be precisely referenced by its subscript in an ISO standard
dictionary of English. When a subscript is not specified then
it defaults to its [0] index meaning.
>
But that juts not the way that people do this.
>
We were not talking about the way that people do this
we were answering the question:
>
Is it possible to eliminate ambiguity in natural language semantics?
Yes it is possible. The CYC project already does this.
>

You are just guilty of a lying Strawman by claiming to be talking
about "Natural Language", when you actually are talking about the
UNnatural language of full tagged language.
>
Your ACTUAL claim turns out to be more like in a FULLY FORMAL
language
with all references being unambigious, we can detect if a
statement is
an axiom of the system by it being isomorphic to one of them.

>
Formalized natural language enables an axiomatic system
of natural language meanings that has zero ambiguity.
>

>
It seems you describe "intersubjectivity", yet the
interpretation of texts is subjective, so, while it

>
So maybe 5 > 3 actually means: "go eat a peanut butter sandwich right
now" ? My axiomatic system abolishes all subjectivity by making all of
the facts of the world as stipulated relations between finite strings.
>

is so that there are formal languages that happen
to intersect and be unambiguous subsets of natural
language, there's always a wider context.
>

>
I am saying that all of the facts of the general knowledge
of the actual world are stipulated relations between finite
strings.
>

Then, the idea that there is a universe of language,
a "Comenius language", which equals "all truisms plus

>
I knew that there was a guy that specified a language
that contains only truisms. The internet seems to have
lost track of this.
>

one prototype of a fallacy discernible from the rest",
is a sort of platonist, monist view of an interobjectivity.
>

>
I don't know what that means.
>

You might learn from both scientific approaches to
interpretation, and deconstructionist approaches to
interpretation, with regards to those being
intersubjective, and eventually structuralist and, "true".
>

>
My system eliminates the need for any interpretation it is all
stipulated relations between finite strings where each sense meaning
of every word has a unique 128-bit integer GUID. Words are combined
together forming larger units of meaning by the principle of
compositionality. Discourse context is explicitly encoded.
>

There's a significant canon about the dogma and doctrine
of these ultimately philosophical and metaphysical aspects
with their teleological and technically philosophical,
and logical and mathematical, objects of interobjectivity.
>
>
So, again, there _are_ extra-ordinary approaches to otherwise
the incomplete aspects of incompleteness and so on,
and there _are_ reasons how to reject and rehabilitate
any "paradoxes" of logic, here for example excluding EFQ,
and making TND only a class of concerns, yet, one may
not simply stipulate that instead only find its disclosure
and discovery, the learning thereof, and the scientific
practice and intersubjective interpretation, for that
two wrongs make not a right.
>

>
  X can't be derived from facts of the world entails untrue.
~X can't be derived from facts of the world entails unfalse.
>
>

A knowledge bank is a great thing for matters of
intersubjective definition.
>
Garbage in?  Garbage out, is the usual idea.
The usual hope is "garbage in:  garbage detected,
garbage deleted".
>
>
--
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
>
>

>

>
When you say "derived" and "entails", it seems you're assuming
you have some "consistent world of facts" which is the usual
idea of a "model", which is not the same thing as "the theory's
model", if in any case at all you're employing "not p, or, q",
or "material implication".
>

>
Material implication is rejected and is replaced with the binary
form of the unary □ necessity operator. This is all done in proof
theory as relations between finite strings. (A ∧ ¬A) □ FALSE
The underlying analysis of True(L, A) requires that A by provable
from the axioms of L. Propositional logic is excluded. One is
not allowed to dogmatically declare that A is True.
>

Then, you got "untrue" and "unfalse", which one might figure
as "not necessarily true" and "not necessarily false", that
"not" and "necessarily" sort of necessarily require precedence
associating contingency or lack thereof with negation or lack thereof.
>

>
~True(L, x) and ~True(L, ~x) entails ~Proposition(L, x).
>

Saying that you have a coding of terms to a large address space,
and being granular in terms instead of composite, has that,
while a dictionary may have entries for each term, the language
has words that are composites etymologically. Words have roots
and turns of phrase have, roots, and the entire history and
historiography of their usage, in, "definitional dynamics".
>

>
Close, yet not quite. All of the current recursive definitions of terms
are stipulated to be true and historical usage is ignored. Pluto is not
a planet.
>

>
The "intersubjectivity" is to mean that "there's no need for
generous or ingenerous interpretation or any sort of
under-standing, it's unambiguous a sole interpretation in
terms of a reference formal model". The idea that a
dictionary is each of its words is that the language
is all of its words.
>

>
The entire formal system of all of the facts of the world are
stipulated relations between finite strings. To minimize space
and maximize effectiveness the most basic facts are stipulated
and most other facts are derived from these basic facts.
>
We don't say: {cats are animals} and {animals are living things}.
Instead {cats} inherits from {animals} that inherits from {living
things} in a knowledge ontology.
>

>
I encountered the term "Comenius language" in Rucker or Hofstadter
if I recall. Then I appropriated it for "a universe of terms",
truisms.
>

>
OK. I have Rucker, I don't have Hofstadter.
>

>
So, a dictionary, is a sort of algebraization, arithmetization,
geometrization. That is, the widely varying objects of algebra,
or the more staid objects of arithmetic or geometry, having an
assignment as a model to a model of other objects, have that
all and only the relations of the model effect the relations of
the modeled. So, having an address space of 2^128 terms,
variously does or doesn't effect any of those. The whole idea
of the vector models is for a group of related terms, to
have them have some of the properties of an algebra, that
reflect that related terms are near to each other in the
address space, reducing the space once landing somewhere
among the terms, from a vector association, to a group of
terms. That's about all there is to it, making an arithmetic
coding of sorts, or a geometric coding of sorts, computing
addresses, and having some of their vector products associated
with the relations in the address space.
>

>
It is all a knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy used in proof
theory not model theory.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>
Same idea as the Cyc project.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc
>

>
A usual old definition of insanity is "doing things the same
and expecting things to change", while, another usual old
definition of insanity is "doing things the same and expecting
things to never change".
>
This is the old Apollo/MarkTwain bit, "for each great saying,
there's an equal and opposite great saying", also "old wrapped
as new".
>
So, a "quasi-modal", logic, and where proof theory and model
theory are equi-interpretable, is not altogether in the common
modality, which is time's temporality, i.e., that's only quasi-modal.
>
A foolish consistency in little minds is bigger in bigger minds.
>
I seem to recall it was Rucker, yet there's a lot in Hofstadter.
>
The only constant is change, ....
>
So, anyways, your ass|u|me and efq+mi is old hat, and,
it's old quasi-modal hat.
>

>
When people realize that the POE is a psychotic break
from reality why has it not been abandoned?
>
mi is counter-intuitive because it says if-then yet does
not actually mean if-then may be more of a communication
error than a logic error.
>

Adding temporality and contingency everywhere is a large
part of what makes logical positivism and science the theory.
>
Where in your theory is that it changes?
>
>

>
If it is raining right now where you are and you go
outside unprotected from the rain then you will get wet.
>
contingency
temporality
location
>
>

How cold is absolute zero?
It's not hot at all, ....
The joke here goes, three people are on a train to
Scotland.  They make a rise of a hill, and above
the rise, is a rise.  On the rise, of the hill,
is a sheep.  Sheep, are black, or white.  The sheep,
is black.
The first person says "ah, sheep, in Scotland, are black".
The second says "ah, at least one sheep, in Scotland, is black".
The third notes "ah, at least one side, of one sheep, at one moment,
appears black".
In Scotland, ....
A usual Zen koan reads, two Buddhist priests observe a flag,
in the breeze.
The first says, "the flag, moves, in the breeze".
The second says, "the breezes, moves, the flag, in it".
A third says "it is your mind that moves".
A usual expectation is that water is wet,
a usual notion of slacking, removes water,
and, not all substances absorb water.
The water in this case falls right off.
Model and proof theory are equi-interpretable,
including where exceptions are rules and rules are exceptions.
Man simplifies the conception of these things
with the fuller dialectic and entertaining
the complementary duals as one.
It's called "thinking" beyond "stimulus box response".